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ABSTRACT
Forensic readiness denotes the capability of a system to
support digital forensic investigations of potential, known
incidents by preserving in advance data that could serve as
evidence explaining how an incident occurred. Given the in-
creasing rate at which (potentially criminal) incidents occur,
designing software systems that are forensic-ready can facil-
itate and reduce the costs of digital forensic investigations.
However, to date, little or no attention has been given to
how forensic-ready software systems can be designed sys-
tematically. In this paper we propose to explicitly represent
evidence preservation requirements prescribing preservation
of the minimal amount of data that would be relevant to a
future digital investigation. We formalise evidence preserva-
tion requirements and propose an approach for synthesising
specifications for systems to meet these requirements. We
present our prototype implementation—based on a satisfiabil-
ity solver and a logic-based learner—which we use to evaluate
our approach, applying it to two digital forensic corpora. Our
evaluation suggests that our approach preserves relevant data
that could support hypotheses of potential incidents. More-
over, it enables significant reduction in the volume of data
that would need to be examined during an investigation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Requirements analysis;
• Applied computing → Evidence collection, storage and
analysis;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Digital forensic investigations are concerned with the dis-
covery, collection, preservation, analysis, interpretation and
presentation of digital data from digital sources, for proof
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of incident and ultimately for prosecution of criminal activ-
ity [16, 36]. Such data often comprises log entries indicating
the occurrence of events in the digital sources placed within
the environment in which an incident can occur. Despite the
availability of digital forensics tools for evidence acquisition
and examination (e.g., [2, 10, 14]), these tools are designed
to be used only after an incident occurs and an investigation
commences. However, some of the relevant data may not be
available then because, for example, it was stored in a volatile
memory or it has been intentionally tampered with by an
offender. Moreover, digital forensic tools do not select among
the data that might be relevant for investigating a specific
incident, thus requiring investigators to sift through large
volumes of data to determine what may be considered as rele-
vant evidence. This can be a cumbersome and an error-prone
process [29, 54].
Software systems should be forensic-ready [45], i.e., able
to support digital forensic investigations of potential, known
incidents by preserving in advance data that may serve as
evidence explaining how an incident occurred. Given the in-
creasing rate at which (potentially criminal) incidents occur,
designing software systems that are forensic-ready can facil-
itate and reduce the costs of digital forensic investigations.
However, existing research has provided only generic guide-
lines capturing operational and infrastructural capabilities for
organisations to achieve forensic readiness [15, 42]. Little or
no attention has been given to how forensic-ready systems can
be designed and verified systematically, nor to how to ensure
their suitability for the specific environments in which they
will be deployed [51]. Without a formal conceptualisation of
a forensic-ready system and a software design methodology
for achieving it, ensuring the soundness of any automated
investigative process or its outcome becomes difficult, or even
impossible [43].
Forensic-ready systems should satisfy evidence preservation
requirements, i.e. ensure preservation of relevant and minimal
evidence. On the one hand, preservation of an excessive
amount of data often introduces resource and performance
issues [40], and increases the cognitive load on investigators
who have to make sense of a large data-set. On the other hand,
preservation of an insufficient amount of data provides an
incomplete picture of how an incident would have occurred,
thus making way for misguided decisions and potentially
wrong convictions [12].
This paper addresses some of the challenges in the system-
atic design of forensic-ready systems by making the following
contributions: (i) precise definition of evidence preservation
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requirements and the concepts upon which these require-
ments depend; (ii) a method for generating preservation
specifications that satisfy evidence preservation requirements
and (iii) a prototype tool for generating such specifications
automatically, which we use to evaluate our approach. More
specifically, we first provide formal definitions of the domain
model of a forensic-ready system including the environment
in which incidents may occur and hypotheses about such
incidents. We also formalise preservation specifications and
requirements. We then present a synthesis approach that com-
bines deductive reasoning and inductive learning to generate
preservation specifications from a formal description of an en-
vironment and hypotheses. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first work that conceptualises the requirements of evi-
dence preservation and demonstrates its benefits in reducing
data needed to be examined during an investigation.
In this work, we assume a domain expert provides a set of
correct incident hypotheses. To achieve this aim s/he can fol-
low a proper risk assessment methodology (using approaches
such as [9]) over the threats/incidents considered most likely
and highly-critical. Specifications are expressed declaratively
in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [39], a commonly used for-
malism for specifying a system behaviour, and prescribe
constraints over when events happening at the digital sources
in the environment must be logged. We also assume that a
designated software controller, the forensic readiness con-
troller, is responsible for the enactment of the specification
by interacting with the digital sources through a uniform
interface. We evaluate our approach by applying it to two
substantive case studies publicly available. Our evaluation
suggests that our approach preserves relevant data to explain
potential incidents and enables significant reduction in the
volume of data that would need to be examined during an
investigation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents a motivating example and an overview of our ap-
proach. Sections 3 and 4 formalise the domain model of a
forensic-ready system and preservation specifications and
requirements. Sections 5 and 6 explain our approach to gener-
ate specifications and its implementation. Section 7 presents
the results of our evaluation. Section 8 gives an overview of
related work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE AND
OVERVIEW
We motivate our work using an example of a corporate fraud
incident, inspired by the Galleon Group case [35]. We consider
an environment (Fig. 1a) within an enterprise building ,
where two employees, bob and alice, work and are provided
with laptops (m2 and m3, respectively) by the company. A
sensitive document doc is stored on the server machine m1
located in the office r01. Access to r01 is controlled by an
NFC reader (nfc) and is monitored by a CCTV camera (cctv).
Both alice and bob are authorised to access r01 and to login
to m1.
employee: aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: nfc
camera: cctv
storage: usb1 
(a)
FR Controller Storage
Domain 
Expert
Environment
Hypotheses
Investigator
Specification
Generation
PS
preserve
(event)
CCTVNFCCOMPUTER
receive(event)
(b)
Figure 1: Setting of our example (a) and overall ap-
proach (b)
Suppose that a digital investigation related to the exfiltra-
tion of the doc is initiated. An investigator may hypothesise
that the doc was copied onto a storage device mounted on m1.
To verify this, she must first speculate the activities that may
have occurred within the environment and reconstruct differ-
ent possible scenarios based on these activities. A possible
scenario is that alice enters room r01, logs into m1, mounts
usb1 on m1 and copies doc onto usb1. Another is that bob
enters room r01 but logs into m1 using alice’s credentials,
and then copies the doc onto usb1.
Once the scenarios have been identified, the investigator
must establish which of the digital devices holds data that
might be relevant to the scenarios. Then she must search
through the storage of these devices (e.g., logs for all readers
and CCTVs, and hard drives for all computers) for relevant
information. However, the investigator may fail to find infor-
mation about storage devices mounted on m1 because the
system log of m1 only retains information about the last de-
vice that was mounted. The large number of events that can
occur also does not make it plausible to preserve all events
in advance for later examination. For example, corporate
computers can generate over 100 millions of events per week1,
while the number of accesses recorded by CCTV cameras
and card readers can exponentially grow with the number
of employees and rooms in a building. Moreover, not all the
events are relevant to support the speculated scenarios. For
instance, only copies of the doc taking place while a storage
device is mounted and a user is logged on m1 are relevant
for our example.
Our approach (Fig. 1b) aims to design a FR controller
that receives events from digital sources within the envi-
ronment and selectively preserves them in a secure storage.
1We estimated having 50 Events Per Second (EPS) during non peaks
and 2500 EPS during peaks. An organisation that experiences peaks
for 5% of the total time will have an average of 215 EPS (125 EPS for
non-peak and 90 for peak).
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These events can be acquired and examined by an inves-
tigator during future digital investigations. We provide an
automated approach (Specification Generation) to generate
a preservation specification (PS) for the FR controller. We
assume a domain expert (e.g., security administrator or soft-
ware engineer) provides a description of the environment and
a predefined set of hypotheses about incidents of concern.
The description of the environment also includes informa-
tion about what activities can be monitored by the digital
sources. To generate a specification, we first check whether
the hypotheses are feasible within the environment (i.e., they
may hold if certain activities take place in the environment).
If this is the case, the approach generates a set of possible se-
quences of low-level system events (called potential histories)
that demonstrate this. The approach then verifies whether
the existing specification already ensures the preservation
of events that correspond to these generated histories. If
not, then our approach inductively synthesises a preservation
specification that configures when an event occurring in a
digital source within the considered environment should be
preserved, according to their relevance to the hypotheses.
For our motivating example, our approach would prescribe
preservation of events indicating copies of the doc only if
a storage device was previously mounted and a user has
previously logged on m1. In the next two sections we define
the artefacts which constitute the domain of a forensic-ready
system (environment, histories and hypotheses) and their
relation to preservation specifications and requirements.
3 FORENSIC DOMAIN MODEL
We provide here a formal underpinning of the concepts and
terminology that are commonly used in digital forensic do-
main [11] to describe the environment in which an incident
can occur, histories and the incident hypotheses.
3.1 Environment Description
The environment description is a set of descriptive statements
about: (i) the context in which an incident may occur, (ii)
the behaviour that may be exhibited within the environment
and (iii) their interactions.
A context description 𝒞 is a collection of descriptive (non-
behavioural) declarations about the types (e.g., employees
and locations), and instances of entities present in an envi-
ronment (e.g., bob and r01 ), and relations between instances,
such as bob is entitled to access r01 (hasbadge(bob,r01)).
Definition 3.1 (Context Description). A context descrip-
tion 𝒞 is a tuple ⟨𝑌, 𝐼, 𝛾,𝐾⟩ where 𝑌 is a set of types, 𝐼 a set
of instances, 𝛾 : 𝐼 → 𝑌 is function that assigns an instance
in 𝐼 to its type in 𝑌 , and 𝐾 is a set of context relations over
instances in 𝐼, such that for every 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑘 ⊆ 𝐼1 × ...× 𝐼𝑛.
We denote the universe of context relations as 𝒦. A context
relation literal is an expression of the form 𝑘 or ¬𝑘 for some
𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. Given a set of context relation literals KL, we write
𝛼(KL) to denote the set of unique context relations in KL.
Returning to our running example, a context description
in this case includes types such as Emp and Comp, instances
including bob and m1 with assignments 𝛾(bob) = Emp and
𝛾(m1) = Comp, and context relations such as isLocatedIn(m1,
r01), meaning that computer m1 is placed in location r01,
and isStoredIn(doc, m1), meaning that doc is stored in m1.
A behavioural description ℬ specifies the events that may
occur within an environment. In a digital investigation set-
ting, these may be at different levels of abstraction. Similar
to [8, 11], we distinguish between two types of events to
represent these levels of abstraction: primitive and complex.
A primitive event represents the occurrence of an atomic
action that can be observed by an investigator from a digital
device (e.g., using a hard drive analysis tools). An example
of primitive event can be swipe card(alice,nfc) indicating the
nfc reading alice’s card tag. A complex event indicates the
execution of complex human activities and can involve one or
more primitive events, other complex events and contextual
conditions. For example, a complex event indicating alice
entering room r01 involves the following primitive events:
alice’s card tag being read by the nfc reader and her entrance
in r01 being recorded by the cctv. These events can happen
at the same time or in any order. The complex event also
involves the following contextual conditions: alice is not in-
side r01 and does not possess a badge to access r01. This is
expressed through a composite definition.
Definition 3.2 (Composite Definition). Let 𝒜𝑝 and 𝒜𝑐 be
the universe of primitive and complex events respectively.
A composite definition is a tuple ⟨𝐴𝑝, 𝐴𝑐,KL, 𝐿,⪯, 𝜆⟩ where
𝐴𝑝 ⊆ 𝒜𝑝,𝐴𝑐 ⊆ 𝒜𝑐, 𝛼(KL) ⊆ 𝒦, 𝐿 is a finite set of time-labels,
⪯⊆ 𝐿× 𝐿 is a partial order relation over 𝐿 (that is reflexive,
anti-symmetric and transitive) and 𝜆 : 𝐿→ 𝒫(𝐴𝑝 ∪𝐴𝑐 ∪KL)
is a labelling function.
Let 𝒟 be a set of composite definitions. We define a relation
▷ ⊆ 𝒜𝑐 ×𝒟 to associate a composite definition 𝑑 ∈ 𝒟 with
the complex event 𝑒 ∈ 𝒜𝑐 it defines. In our example, the com-
plex event enter(alice,r01 ) may be defined as enter(alice,r01 )
▷⟨ {swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access(alice,r01,cctv1 ) }, ∅,
{¬ in(alice, r01 ), hasBadge(alice,r01 )}, {𝑙1, 𝑙2},∅, {𝑙1 →
{swipe card(alice,nfc),¬ in(alice, r01 ), hasBadge(alice,r01 )},
𝑙2 →{cctv access(alice,r01, cctv1 ), ¬ in(alice, r01 )}}⟩.
For our example, to trigger complex event enter(alice, r01 ),
primitive events swipe card(alice,nfc) and cctv access(alice,r01,
cctv1 ) can occur in any order; however, both have to occur.
When swipe card(alice,nfc) and cctv access(alice,r01, cctv1 )
occur alice should not be in r01. Moreover alice should be au-
thorised to access r01 (hasBadge) when swipe card(alice,nfc)
occurs. Moreover, complex event mount(usb1,m1 ) event oc-
curs when the system log inm1 records the mounting of a stor-
age device (primitive event sys mount(usb1, m1 )) while alice
or bob are logged to m1 (context condition 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑(𝑒,m1 )).
This is defined as mount(usb1,m1 ) ▷⟨ {sys mount(usb1, m1 )
}, ∅, {𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑(𝑒,m1 )}, {𝑙1},∅, {𝑙1 → { sys mount(usb1, m1 ),
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑(𝑒,m1 )}}⟩.
A behavioural description includes the composite defini-
tions associated with the complex events that can occur in the
environment. A behavioural description is formally defined
as follows.
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Definition 3.3 (Behavioural Description). A behavioural
description ℬ is a tuple ⟨𝒜𝑝,𝒜𝑐,𝒦,𝒟, ▷⟩ such that for every
𝑒 ▷ 𝑑, 𝑒 ∈ 𝒜𝑐, 𝑑 = ⟨𝐿𝑑,⪯𝑑, 𝜆𝑑, 𝐴𝑝𝑑, 𝐴𝑐𝑑,KL𝑑⟩ ∈ 𝒟, 𝐴𝑝𝑑 ⊆ 𝒜𝑝,
𝐴𝑐𝑑 ⊆ 𝒜𝑐 and 𝛼(KL𝑑) ⊆ 𝒦.
Complex events are expected to interact and bring about
changes to the context in which they occur. To capture
this effect, we adopt notions of fluents for event-driven sys-
tems [22, 31]. Given the set 𝒦 of context relations, each
𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 is defined by two disjoint sets of complex events
from 𝒜𝑐 (called initiating and terminating events, respec-
tively) and an initial value (true or false), written accord-
ing to the following schema: 𝑘 ≡ ⟨IN𝑘,TR𝑘, init𝑘⟩ such
that IN𝑘 ∩ TR𝑘 = ∅ and IN𝑘 ∪ TR𝑘 ⊂ 𝒜𝑐. The set of
associations of this form are called interaction definitions,
and are denoted ℐ. In our running example the interaction
definition of context relation in(alice, r01 ) is defined by
⟨{enter(alice, r01)}, {exit(alice, r01)}, false⟩. This interaction
indicates that context relation in(alice, r01 ) is initially false;
it is initiated by complex event enter(alice, r01 ) and termi-
nated by complex event exit(alice, r01 ).
From 𝒞, ℬ and ℐ we define an environment description.
Definition 3.4 (Environment Description). An environ-
ment description ℰ is a tuple ⟨𝒞,ℬ, ℐ⟩ where 𝒞 = ⟨𝑌, 𝐼, 𝛾,𝒦⟩
is a context description, ℬ = ⟨𝒜𝑝,𝒜𝑐,𝒦,𝒟, ▷⟩ a behavioural
description and ℐ is a set of context relation definitions such
that ∀𝑘 ≡ ⟨IN𝑘,TR𝑘, init𝑘⟩ ∈ ℐ. 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 and IN𝑘 ∪TR𝑘 ⊆ 𝒜𝑐.
3.2 Histories
A history is a sequence of (concurrent) events that captures
the evolution of an environment in which the digital devices
and evidence sources operate [11]. It is potential if it refers to
at least one event that has been speculated and actual if all
the events have been observed from digital sources within the
environment. In this paper, we focus on potential histories
for defining preservation requirements.
A history may describe events at various levels. It is called
a primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted 𝜎 (resp. 𝜔), if
all the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).
We write 𝜔 = ce1, ...ce𝑛 to denote a complex history where
ce𝑖 is the set of complex events occurring concurrently at
position 𝑖, and similarly for a primitive history 𝜎.
An environment description ℰ is interpreted over a se-
quence of primitive and complex events (referred to as a
hybrid history 𝜐). Its satisfaction is determined with respect
to the satisfaction of complex events’ composite definitions
in ℬ w.r.t. to ℐ.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
consider the notion of a ‘narration’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). For a
narration to be constructed, each complex event appearing
in a definition is refined until all complex events are reduced
to their primitive events and context relation literals. The
result of this refinement procedure applied to definition 𝑑 is
a set of composite definitions 𝛿(𝑑). 2
2See https://github.com/lpasquale/minorityReport for an outline of a
refinement algorithm for obtaining 𝛿(𝑑).
Given 𝛿(𝑑), a narration of 𝑑 is captured with respect to
one of the elements in 𝛿(𝑑). We will use the notation 𝜐|𝐴𝑝
(reps. 𝜐|𝐴𝑐) to denote the projection of 𝜐 over primitive
(reps. complex) events in 𝐴𝑝 (resp. 𝐴𝑐).
Definition 3.5 (Narration of Composite Definition). Let
ℬ= ⟨𝒜𝑝, 𝒜𝑐,𝒦,𝒟, ▷⟩ be a behavioural description and 𝑑 =
⟨𝐿𝑑,⪯𝑑, 𝜆𝑑, 𝐴𝑝𝑑, 𝐴𝑐𝑑,KL𝑑⟩ a composite definition in 𝒟. Let
𝛿(𝑑) be the set of definitions obtained refining 𝑑. A narration
of 𝑑 is a hybrid history 𝜎 = he1, ..., he𝑚, if there exists a
𝑑′ ∈ 𝛿(𝑑) and a total order 𝑙1 ≺ ... ≺ 𝑙𝑛 over 𝐿𝑑′ such that:
∙ for all 𝑙𝑖, 𝑙𝑗 ∈ 𝐿𝑑′ , if 𝑙𝑖 ≺ 𝑙𝑗 then 𝑎 < 𝑏 (where 1 ≤
𝑎, 𝑏 ≤ 𝑚),
∙ 𝜆𝑑′(𝑙𝑖)|𝐴𝑝 = (he𝑎)|𝐴𝑝
∙ 𝜆𝑑′(𝑙𝑖)|𝐴𝑐 = (he𝑎)|𝐴𝑐 .
where 𝜆(𝑙)|𝐴𝑝 and 𝜆(𝑙)|𝐴𝑐 denote the set of primitive events
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label 𝑙.
For instance the following are three example narrations
for enter(alice, r01 )’s composite definition:
𝜐1 = ({swipe card(alice,nfc), cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
𝜐2 = ({swipe card(alice,nfc)}1,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
𝜐3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice,nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Interaction descriptions are interpreted over complex his-
tories. Given 𝑘 ≡ ⟨IN𝑘,TR𝑘, init𝑘⟩ ∈ ℐ, 𝑘 is true at position
𝑏 in a complex history 𝜔 = ce1, ..., ce𝑏, ..., ce𝑛 iff either the
following holds:
∙ init𝑘 ∧∀𝑎 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑒TR𝑘 ∈ TR𝑘.(0 < 𝑎 < 𝑏)→ 𝑒TR𝑘 ̸∈ ce𝑎;
∙ ∃𝑎 ∈ 𝒩 . (𝑎 < 𝑏) ∧ (𝑒IN𝑘 ∈ ce𝑎 ∧ ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑒TR𝑘 ∈
TR𝑘.((𝑎 < 𝑔 < 𝑏)→ 𝑒TR𝑘 ̸∈ ce𝑔);
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do
not occur concurrently. We define below satisfaction of a
complex event.
Definition 3.6 (Complex Event Satisfaction). Given an
environment description ℰ=(ℬ,𝒞,ℐ), a composite definition
𝑑 associated with complex event 𝑒 (𝑒 ▷ 𝑑 ∈ ℬ) and a hybrid
history 𝜐, 𝜐 is said to satisfy 𝑒 ▷ 𝑑 with respect to ℰ if for
every decomposition 𝜐 = 𝑥𝑦𝑧, if 𝑦 = he𝑎, ..., he𝑔, ..., he𝑏 is a
narration of 𝑑 with respect to 𝑑′ ∈ 𝛿(𝑑) and order 𝑙′1 ≺ ... ≺
𝑙′𝑗 ≺ ... ≺ 𝑙′𝑛 then:
∙ 𝑒 ∈ (he𝑏)|𝐴𝑐
∙ if kl ∈ 𝜆𝑑′(𝑙′𝑗)|KL then 𝜐|𝒜𝑐 , 𝑔 |= kl
where 𝜆(𝑙)|KL denotes the set of context relation literals
assigned to time-label 𝑙.
The environment description ℰ is said to be satisfied in a
hybrid history if every complex event in 𝐴𝑐 is satisfied in that
history. We write Υ(ℰ) to denote the set of hybrid histories
that satisfy ℰ .
Figure 2 shows a hybrid history satisfying ℰ of our example.
We project the primitive and complex events composing the
hybrid history onto primitive and complex histories, respec-
tively. The primitive history represents the case in which
(1) the nfc reads alice’s card tag, (2) the cctv records alice
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passing through the door of r01, and m1 logs (3) the login
performed by user bob, (4) the mount of storage device usb1,
(5) the copy od the doc by user bob, and (6) the unmount
of usb1. If a portion of the primitive history represents a
narration of a composite definition associated with a com-
plex event, such event is assumed to occur. For example, the
sequence of primitive events at time 1 and 2 corresponds to
narration 𝑣2 of the composite definition of enter(alice,r01 ).
While the primitive event at time 4 represents a narration
for the composite definition of event mount(usb1, m1 ). On
top of Figure 2 we indicate the context relations that hold
at each time instant and omit those that are not satisfied,
e.g., mounted(usb1,m1 ) starts holding when complex event
mount(usb1,m1 ) occurs and stops holding when complex
event unmount(usb1,m1 ) happens.
Legend primitive event complex event
swipe_card
(alice, nfc)
1 3 4 5
primitive
historycctv_access(alice, r01, cctv)
sys_login
(bob, m1)
sys_mount
(usb1, m1)
sys_copy
(bob,doc, m1)
enter
(alice, r01)
context
relations
complex
history
login
(bob, m1)
mount
(usb1, m1)
copy
(bob, doc, m1)
sys_unmount
(usb1, m1)
6
unmount
(usb1, m1)
2
logged
(bob, m1)
mounted
(usb, m1)
in
(alice, r01)
logged
(bob, m1)
in
(alice, r01)
in
(alice, r01)
in
(alice, r01)
logged
(bob, m1)
mounted
(usb, m1)
logged
(bob, m1)
in
(alice, r01)
Figure 2: Example of hybrid history
3.3 Hypotheses
The term hypothesis in a digital investigation is a conjecture
that may refer, for instance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital devices [52]. In this paper, we focus on one type
of hypothesis relevant to developing forensic-ready systems,
the environment construction hypothesis. This form of hy-
pothesis postulates about the feasibility of events occurrence
and presence of contextual conditions of interests within the
environment. It may be captured as an event’s composite
definition ℎ ▷ 𝑑, where ℎ is a complex event marking the
satisfaction of a hypothesis, and with 𝐴𝑝 in 𝑑 being empty
and 𝐴𝑐 and KL containing only complex events and context
relation literals respectively. The events and the contextual
conditions expressed in the hypothesis represent how an inci-
dent may occur within the environment. The incident of our
example refers to the unauthorised exfiltration of the sensi-
tive document doc. One way in which the doc can exfiltrate is
because an unauthorised copy to an external storage device
was performed. This hypothesis is defined as
IllegalCopy ▷
⟨∅, {copy(bob, doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{𝑙1}, ∅, {𝑙1 → {mounted(usb1,m1), copy(bob, doc,m1)}}⟩
In other words, a copy of the document is performed while
an external storage device (usb1 ) is mounted on m1.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition below.
Definition 3.7 (Hypotheses Satisfaction). A hypothesis ℎ
(with definition ℎ▷𝑑) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
𝜔 at position 𝑏, i.e., 𝜔, 𝑏 |= ℎ, if there exists a decomposition
𝜔 = 𝑥𝑦𝑧 such that 𝑦 = ce𝑎, ..., ce𝑔, ..., ce𝑏 is a narration of 𝑑
with respect to 𝑑′ ∈ 𝛿(𝑑) and order 𝑙′1 ≺ ... ≺ 𝑙′𝑗 ≺ ... ≺ 𝑙′𝑛
and if kl ∈ 𝜆𝑑′(𝑙′𝑗)|KL then 𝜐|𝒜𝑐 , 𝑔 |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment ℰ .
Definition 3.8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutabil-
ity). Let Υ(ℰ) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying ℰ . A
hypothesis ℎ (with definition ℎ ▷ 𝑑) is said to be supportable
in ℰ if there exists a hybrid history 𝜐 ∈ Υ(ℰ) such that for
some 𝑏, 𝜐|𝒜𝑐 , 𝑏 |= ℎ. It is said to be refutable if there exists
a history 𝜐 ∈ Υ(ℰ) such that for all 𝑏, 𝜐|𝒜𝑐 , 𝑏 ̸|= ℎ.
We sometime abstract away from the position 𝑏 and write
𝜐|𝒜𝑐 |= ℎ for a history satisfying ℎ at some point 𝑏. We
will denote the set of hybrid histories in Υ(ℰ) supporting
at least one hypothesis in ℋ as Υ+(ℰ) and those refuting
every hypothesis in ℋ as Υ−(ℰ). Returning to our example,
the IllegalCopy hypothesis is supportable in our example
environment (ℰ) since there exists a decomposition of a hybrid
history (see Figure 2) satisfying ℰ , that yields a narration of
the definition of the IllegalCopy hypothesis, i.e.,
𝑥 = {swipe card(alice,nfc)}1,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2,
{sys login(bob,m1), login(bob,m1)}3,
{sys mount(usb1,m1),mount(usb1,m1)}4
𝑦 = {sys copy(bob, doc, cctv1), copy(bob, doc, cctv1)}5,
𝑧 = {sys unmount(usb1,m1)}6
such that 𝜐|𝒜𝑐 , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1).
As we will see later in Section 4, we are interested in
minimal hybrid histories that satisfy a hypothesis. We define
minimality of histories with respect to hypotheses as follows.
Definition 3.9. [Minimally Supportive Histories] Let Υ(ℰ)
be a set of hybrid histories satisfying ℰ and ℎ be a hypothesis
supportable by ℰ . The hybrid history 𝜐 = he1, ..., he𝑚 ∈
Υ+(ℰ) is said to be minimally supportive of ℎ in ℰ iff the
history 𝜐* obtained be removing any primitive event 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑝
from (he𝑖)|𝐴𝑝 of 𝜐 is in Υ(ℰ) and no longer supports ℎ.
For instance, the hybrid history in Figure 2 is not min-
imally supportive of the hypothesis IllegalCopy since the
history obtained by removing sys unmount(usb1,m1) from
𝜐6|𝐴𝑝 still satisfies IllegalCopy. We sometimes write min(𝜐, ℎ)
(resp. min(Υ, ℎ)) as a shorthand for the minimally supportive
history 𝑣* (resp. histories) of ℎ obtained from 𝜐.
4 PRESERVATION SPECIFICATIONS
We are concerned with deriving specifications PS for a foren-
sic readiness controller comprising domain pre- and post-
conditions as well as required pre- and trigger-conditions,
expressed in LTL. These conditions control the execution
of operations of the form preserve(𝑎,ts)—where 𝑎 indicates
the occurrence of a primitive event in the environment, and
ts marks the time-stamp (from the system clock) at which
the occurrence was observed by the FR controller. We con-
sider ts𝑖 to be an abstraction over real-time clock variables
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that may be obtained following techniques such as [13, 28].
The generation of such abstractions is outside the scope of
the paper. We assume an ordered set of timestamps to be
isomorphic to the set of natural numbers.
The domain pre-condition of operation preserve(𝑎,ts) spec-
ifies that this operation cannot take place if the occurrence
of event 𝑎 at ts has already been preserved. The domain
post-condition specifies that operation preserve(𝑎,ts) ensures
preservation of the occurrence of event 𝑎 at ts in the next
time instant. We assume these ar given for each operation. We
Assertions 1 and 2 specify, respectively, the domain pre- and
post-conditions of operation preserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)
∀ts : Timestamp, 𝑒 : Emp, 𝑑 : Doc,𝑚 : Comp
G(preserved(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)→
¬preserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)) (1)
G(preserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)→
Xpreserved(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)) (2)
Required pre-conditions are assertions that condition the
execution of preserve(𝑎,ts) upon having received notification
about the occurrence of a primitive event in the environment,
receive(𝑎, ts). Required trigger-conditions are conditions upon
the (non-)preservation of other primitive events. An example
of a preservation specification of operation preserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)
is
∀ts : Timestamp, 𝑒 : Emp, 𝑑 : Doc,𝑚 : Comp
G(¬received(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)→
X¬preserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)) (3)
∀ts : Timestamp, 𝑒 : Emp, 𝑑 : Doc,𝑚 : Comp
∃𝑡𝑠1, ts2 : Timestamp. ts1 < ts2 ∧ ts2 < ts
G(received(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)∧
preserved(sys login(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts1) ∧ preserved(sys mount(𝑠,𝑚), ts2)
∧ ̸ ∃ts3, ts4 : Timestamp. (ts3 > 𝑡𝑠1 ∧ ts3 ≤ ts ∧ ts4 > 𝑡𝑠2 ∧ ts4 ≤ ts ∧
preserved(sys logout(𝑒,𝑚), ts3) ∧ preserved(sys unmount(𝑠,𝑚), ts4))→
Xpreserve(sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚), ts)) (4)
Assertion 3 specifies the required pre-condition, i.e., receiv-
ing notification of the occurrence of sys copy(𝑒,𝑑,𝑚). Asser-
tion 4 expresses a trigger-condition forcing the FR controller
to preserve occurrence of sys copy(𝑒, 𝑑,𝑚) if it has already
preserved information about an employee’s logging onto a
computer and the mounting of a storage device on that com-
puter, but no subsequent occurrence about the employee
logging out or unmounting of the storage device is recorded.
The preservation specification PS defines a FR controller’s
storage capacities as a set of executable sequences of preserve
operations of the form
𝜋 = {preserve(𝑎11, ts1), ..., preserve(𝑎𝑘1 , ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(𝑎1𝑚, ts𝑚), ..., preserve(𝑎𝑟𝑚, ts𝑚)}𝑚
We say that 𝜋 is a potential log if 𝜋 satisfies PS (according to
standard trace semantics of LTL) and for each preserve(𝑎𝑖𝑗 , ts𝑗) ∈
𝜋(𝑗), its required trigger-condition is non-vacuously satisfied
in 𝜋 at position 𝑗. The notation 𝜋(𝑗) indicates the set of
operations that occur at position 𝑗.
We restrict our definition of preservation specifications to
those that ensure theminimality and relevance of all potential
logs to hypotheses under consideration. Such a specification
is referred to as forensic-ready. To express forensic-ready
preservation specifications, we first consider the notion of a
specification covering potential histories.
Definition 4.1. [Specification Coverage] Let PS be a preser-
vation specification and 𝜐 = (he1, ..., he𝑛) a hybrid history.
Then PS is said to cover 𝜐, iff there exists a potential log
𝜋 = (fe1, ..., fe𝑛) ∈ Π(PS) isomorphic to 𝜐|𝒜𝑝 , i.e., for every
primitive event 𝑎 ∈ (he𝑖)|𝒜𝑝 , preserve(𝑎, ts𝑖) ∈ fe𝑖.
The isomorphism with respect to potential histories guar-
antees the preservation of events related to an incident. Fur-
thermore, since the isomorphism is defined with respect to
minimally supportive histories of hypotheses in ℋ this en-
sures minimality of preserved event occurrences. It also, to-
gether with the requirement for hypotheses ℋ to be refutable
by potential histories of ℰ , Υ−(ℰ), supports relevance of
events stored through preserve operations.
Definition 4.2. [Forensic-ready Specification] Let ℰ be an
environment description and ℋ a hypothesis that is both
supportable and refutable in ℰ by Υ+(ℰ) and Υ−(ℰ) respec-
tively. Let PS be a preservation specification. Then PS is
said to be forensic-ready with respect to ℋ in ℰ iff PS covers
every history in min(Υ+(ℰ), ℎ) for every ℎ ∈ ℋ and does not
cover any Υ−(ℰ).
Any FR controller whose specification is forensic-ready
with respect to ℋ in ℰ is sufficient to guarantee evidence
preservation requirements of relevance and minimality.
5 SPECIFICATION GENERATION
Based on our formulation above, we propose a systematic ap-
proach (Figure 3) for generating forensic-ready preservation
specifications. Our approach takes as input an environment
description ℰ , a set of speculative incident hypotheses ℋ,
elicited, for instance, by a domain expert, and an initial
preservation specification PS, written in LTL, which contains
domain pre- and post-conditions of preservation operations.
We assume that the description of the environment is cor-
rect and the speculative hypotheses of concern are known at
design-time. The approach provides as output either: (i) a
confirmation that (some) hypotheses are not supportable in
the environment; (ii) a confirmation that the FR controller
does not have the capabilities to ensure the forensic-readiness
of its preservation specification; or (iii) a preservation specifi-
cation that is guaranteed to be forensic-ready with respect
to ℋ in ℰ . The approach comprises three phases as described
below.
1) History Generation. In this phase, we search for hybrid
histories Υ+(ℰ) and Υ−(ℰ) that minimally support and that
refute ℋ, respectively. The existence of histories in Υ+(ℰ)
ensures that the hypotheses of interest are feasible within the
intended environment. If Υ+(ℰ) is empty, this means that
either the hypothesis cannot occur within the environment
described, and thus it will not require to be considered during
a digital investigation, or that the environment description
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some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specification
Operational preservation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controller component
in terms of domain-specific conditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed to
satisfy preservation requirements [46]. The controlled opera-
tions for the controller are a set of preserve(a,ts) operations
where a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clock) at which the occurrence was observed by the
controller. The monitored event (and condition) are the r ceipt
of a notification of occurrence captured by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specific condition captures the basic state tran-
sitions defined by the application of an operation in the
domain. It is specified as a pair containing a domain pre-
condition (DomPre) and a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved(a, ts). Required condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened conditions
on the software-controlled operations that contribute to the
satisfaction of the requirements. They are expressed in the
form of required pre- and trigger- conditions. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a permission to
perform a preserve operation. Required trigger-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational preservation
requirements for the operations preserve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
preserved(sys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage device.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstraction over real-time clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[24], [10]. The generation of such abstractions is outside the
scope of the paper.
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an environment description E and a hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential history   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS covers   for short.) It
is said to be preservation complete w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potential histories in ⌥+(E) and not any history in ⌥ (E).
We say the any specification that meets the preservation
completeness described above achieves the preservation re-
quirement for H in E , denoted RH, and by abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E), ⌥ (E)
Our approach for synthesising the preservation specification
(see Fig. 3) takes as input an environment description E , and a
set of speculative incident hypotheses H, elicited, for instance,
by a domain expert (software engineer or security administra-
tor). We assume that the description of the environment is
correct and the speculative hypotheses of concern are known
at design-time. The approach comprises three phases.
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to define
and formalise preservation requirements within a software
engineering context and to propose an automatic means for
synthesising specifications that satisfy them.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating example is a corporate fraud incident,
inspired by the Galleon Group case [19]. We consider an
environment within an enterprise building, where two employ-
ees, alice and bob, work (see Fig. 1). bob and alice have
laptops (m2 and m3, respectively), provided by the company.
A sensitive document doc is stored on the server machine m1
that is located in the office r01. Access to r01 is controlled
by a nfc reader and is monitored by a cctv camera. Both alice
and bob are authorised to access r01 and to login to m1. An
incident of concern is relate to the xfiltration of the doc.
Activities such entering a room may be observed (inferred)
through low level system events that can be observed from
digital devices, referred to as evidence sources. Examples of
low level events can be a log entry on an external server to
which cctv is connected identifying an agent coming through
the room door, or an nfc log entry recording the reading of a
card tag.
employee: aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: nfc1
camera: cctv1
storage: ubs1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
Suppose that a digital investigation related to the doc
exfiltration is initiated. An investigator may suspect that the
doc was copied onto a storage device mounted on m1 and may
formulate a hypothesis on this basis. However she is uncertain
about what exact events must have occurred for this hypothesis
to be true. Hence, she reconstructs various scenarios about pos-
sible system events that could have occurred (i.e., histories).
One possibility is that alice entered r01, performed the login
to m1, mounted usb1 on m1 and copied the doc. Another
is that bob entered the room but used alice’s credentials to
login to m1 and copy the file onto usb1. A more sophisticated
alternative may be that alice accessed r01 and mounted a
storage device, and she subsequently copied the doc in the
storage remotely. Each of these possibilities would require the
investigator to identify the relevant devices, search through the
records for each of these devices (e.g., logs from all readers,
cctv recordings, and hard drives for all machines) and check
if they support or refute her hypothesis.
Given the multitude of histories that could be constructed
within an environment, a sound investigation would be depen-
dent on a) the investigators’ ability to reconstruct all possible
histories, b) the devices to preserve the required activities
that correspond to such histories and c) the investigators to
examine all these against the hypotheses. As the volume of
data to analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
and pressure t deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on investigators escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be concealed by offenders (clearing hard-
drive system history) or might not be retained by a device (file
copies events), potential evidence may be lost.
Although preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence sources in the environment may seem
plausible, examination of large data-sets is often expensive
and time-consuming and may mask what is truly relevant for
the investigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
average. In the example, not all file copy events are relevant to
support the speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
while a storage device is currently mounted. Therefore, there
is a pressing need for developing systems that are forensic-
ready, i.e., that can preserve ‘relevant’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
preservation requirements be formulated precisely? 2) What
are the system specifications that could achieve them and can
these by synthesised automatically?
To articulate the p oblem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] approach to requirements definitions and satisfaction.
In their requirements reference model [], to guarantee that
a machine achieves its requirements R, it is necessary to
show that its specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘domain knowledge’ — descriptive assertions
about world phenomena that are true regardless of behaviour
of the machine. In our setting W comprises the environment
description E , and the speculative incident hypotheses H. The
‘specification’ S represents operational constraints over what
and when the ’machine’, must preserve having speculated
over events lying in the shared phenomena. In our case, these
specifications as operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preservation requirements are
properties over E , H and OS requiring OS to preserve any
event belonging to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), where RH denotes the requirement
preservations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservation requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approach for synthesising preservation specifications
from speculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the latter we assume the design choice of having a
single Controller that interacts with the individual evidence
sources and whose preservation specification we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller receives events from the digital
no
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some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid hi tory shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specification
Operational preservation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controller component
in terms of domain-specific conditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed to
satisfy preservation requirements [46]. The controlled opera-
tions for the controller are a set of preserve(a,ts) operations
where a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clock) at which the occurrence was observed by the
controller. The monitored event (and condition) are the receipt
of a notification of occurrence captured by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specific condition captures the basic state tran-
sitions defined by th application of an operation in the
domain. It is pecified as a pair contai ing a domain pre-
condition (DomPre) and a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬p served(a, ts) and pres rve (a, ts). Required condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened conditions
on the software-controlled operations that contribute to the
satisfaction of the requirements. They are expressed in the
form of required pre- and trigger- conditions. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a permission to
perform a preserve operation. Required trigger-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational preservation
requirements for the operations preserve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
preserved(sys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage device.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is d not d as ⇧(OS).
We now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstraction over real-time clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[24], [10]. The generation of such abstractions is outside the
scope of the paper.
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an environment description E and a hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential history   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
2 (hei)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS covers   for short.) It
is said to be preservation complete w.r.t. E and H if t covers
all potential histories in ⌥+(E) and not any history in ⌥ (E).
We say the any specification that meets the preservati n
completeness described above achieves the preservation re-
quirement for H in E , denoted RH, and by abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E)
Our approach for synthesising the preservation specification
(see Fig. 3) takes as input an environment description E , and a
set of speculative incident hypotheses H, elicited, for instance,
by a domain expert (software engineer or security administra-
tor). We assume that the description of the environment is
correct and the speculative hypotheses of concern are known
at design-time. The approach comprises three phases.
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A history may occur at various levels [?]. It i called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).We
wr te ! = ce1, ..cen to denot a complex history where cei is
the set of complex events occurring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environment description E is interpreted over a sequence
of primitive and complex events (we refer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined with respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite definitions in B
according to I.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
consider the notion of a ‘narration’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). For a
narration to be constructed, ach complex event appearing in
a definition is refined until all complex events are reduced to
their primitive events and context relation literals. The result
of this refinement procedure applied to definition d is a set of
composite definitions  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refined by their initiating and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narration of a d is captured with respect to
o of the elements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the projection of   over primitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definition 5 (Narration of Composite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be a behaviour description and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a co posite definition in D. Let  (d) be
the set of definitions obtained refining d. A narration of d is
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, if there exists a d0 2  (d)
and a total order l1   ...   ln over Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the set of primitive events
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For nstance the f llowing are three example narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relations are interpreted over complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concur ently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event definitions histories as follows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment descriptio E=(B,C,I), a complex event d f-
inition e / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with respect to E if for every decompo ition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• if d is a composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the set context relation literals assigned
to time-label l.
The environment description E is said o be satisfied in
a hybrid history if every complex event definition in B is
satisfied in that history. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histories that satisfy E .
C. Hypotheses
The term hypothesis in a digital investigation is a conjecture
that may refer, for instance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital devices, the time span during which a system was
operational, system capabilities and configurations [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus on one type of hypothesis rel-
evant to developing forensic-ready systems, the environ-
ment construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis pos-
tulates about the feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
ence of contextual conditions of interests. It may be cap-
ured as an vent’s composite definition h / d, where h
is a complex event marking the satisfaction of a hypoth-
esis, and with Ap in d being empty and Ac and KL
containing only complex events and context relation lit-
erals respectively. For instance the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bob,doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mounted(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition below.
Definition 7 (Hypotheses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
definition h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
! at position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if there exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition h / d) is said to be supportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
yes
A history may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to denote a complex history where cei is
the set of complex events oc urring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environment description E is interpreted over a sequence
of primitive and complex events (we refer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined wit respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite definitions in B
according to I.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
consider the not on of a ‘narration’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). For a
narration to be constructed, each complex event appearing in
a definition is refined until all complex events are reduced to
their primitive events and context relation literals. The result
of this refinement procedure applied to definition d is a set of
composite definitions  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refined by their initiating and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narration of a d is captured with respect to
one of the elements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(r ps.  |Ac ) to denote the pr jection of   over rimitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definiti n 5 (Narration of Composite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be a behaviour description and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composite definition in D. Let  (d) be
the set of definitions obtained refining d. A narration of d is
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, if there exists a d0 2  (d)
and a total rder l1   ...   ln ove Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the set of primitive events
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For instance the following are three example narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s pe ca d(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relations are interpreted over complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concurrently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event definitions histories as follows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition e / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with respect to E if for every decomposition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• if d is a composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the set context relation literals assigned
to time-label l.
The environment description E is said to be satisfied in
a hybrid history if every complex event definition in B is
satisfied in that history. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histories that s tisfy E .
C. Hypotheses
The term hypothesis in a igital investigation is a c njecture
that may refer, for instance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital devices, th time span during which a system was
operational, system capabilities and configurations [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus on one type of hy othesis rel-
evant to developing forensic-ready systems, the environ-
ment construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis pos-
tulates about the feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
ence of contextual conditions of interests. It may be cap-
tured as an event’s composite definition h / d, where h
is a complex event marking the satisfaction of a hypoth-
esis, and ith Ap in d being empty and Ac and KL
containing o ly c mplex events and context relatio lit-
erals respectively. For instance the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bob,doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mounted(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition bel w.
Definition 7 (Hypotheses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
definition h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
! at position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if there exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition h / d) is said to be supportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specifi ation
Operational pr ervation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controll r component
in terms of domain-specific co ditions, as well as additional
con traints fo when operations may and must be executed
to satisfy preservation require ents [?]. The controlled oper-
ations for the controller are a set of pres rve(a,ts) operations
where a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clo k) at wh ch the occurrence was observed by the
cont ller. Th mon tored event (and c ndition) are the receipt
of a notification of occurrenc captured by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specifi condition c ptures th basic state tra -
sitions d fi ed by the application of an operation in the
domain. It is specified a a pair containing a domain p -
condition (DomPre) and a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬pre erved( , ts) and pres rved(a, ts). R quired condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened co ditions
on the software-controlled operations that contribute to the
satisfaction of the requirements. Th y are expre sed in the
form of required pre- and trigger- condit s. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions th t capture a p rmission to
perform preserve operation. Req ired trigg r-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational p eservation
requirements for he operations pr serve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, docu ent d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys c py(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPo t(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserv (sys copy(e, d,m), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
pres rved( ys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved by the Controller in he storage, if the latter
already contains entries about the occurrences of employee’s
logging to a computer and the mounting of a storage device on
it, and no entries about employee’s logging out from computer
and unmounting of the storage device from the computer are
stored.
An operati nal preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missibl preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
W now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
th t we consider tsi to be an bs raction over real-tim clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[16], [7]. The generation of such abstr ctions is outside the
scop of the paper. We...
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an environment description E and a hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential history   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
pot ntial log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., f n) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS cover   for short.) It
is aid to b preservation complete w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potential histories in ⌥+(E) and not any hist ry in ⌥ (E).
We say the any specification that meets the preservation
completeness described above achieves th preservation e-
quirement for H i E , de oted RH, and by abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Our approach for synthesising the preservation specification
(see Figure 3) requires as input an environment description
E , and a set of speculative incident hypotheses H that are
supportable and refu able by E . Such inputs can be provided,
for instance, b he software engineer. We assume that the
description of the environment is correct and the sp culative
hypotheses are known a-priori, before an investigation starts.
Preservation specification synthesis is performed in three
phases.
1) History Generati . In this p ase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) with respect to H. The existence
of h tories in ⌥+(E) ensures that the hypotheses of inter-
est are feasible w thin the i t d d environment. If ⌥+(E)
is empty, this means that the it r the ypothesis cannot
occur within the environment described, and thus may not
be a security concern, o that the environment description
and/or the speculative hypotheses are incorrect and need to
be revised (e.g., by a security administrator). The histories
⌥ (E) operates as a proxy for the synthesis phase to ensure
nly relevant event occurren es are preserved.
2) Specification Verification. Given the generated ⌥+(E), we
check if the primitive history pr jection for each history is
‘covered’ by the preservation specification, i.e., there exists
corresponding potential log. If this is th c se, then the
current preservation specification OS satisfies the preservation
requirements and the process terminates. If some primitive
history projection is not, then new operational preservation
specification must be synthesised in the next phase.
3) Specification Synthesis. The synthesis aims to learn a
new ReqPre and required trigger-conditions ReqTrighat would
prescribe th preservati n of the potential histories ⌥+(E)
and not those in ⌥ (E). The output is a set of requir d pr -
conditions . The new specificatio OS0 is given as input to the
forensic-ready controller that is responsible for its enactment
during the system operation.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to define
and formalise preservation requirements within a software
engineering context and to prop se an automatic means for
synthesising specifications th t atisfy t m.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating exam le is a corporate fraud incid t,
inspir d by th Galleon Grou case [19]. We co sider an
nvironment within an e terp ise building, where two empl y-
e s, ali e and bob, w rk (see Fig. 1). bob and alice have
laptops (m2 and m3, respectively), provided by the company.
A s nsi ive document doc is stored on the server machine m1
that is located in the ffic r01. Ac ess to r01 is controlled
by a nfc read r and is monitored by a cctv camera. Both alice
and bob are authorised to access r01 and to login to m1. An
incident of conc rn is related to t e exfiltration of the doc.
Activities such enteri g room may be observed (inferred)
through low level s stem event that can be obs rv d from
digi al devices, referred to as evidence sources. Examples of
l w level event can be a log entry on an extern l server to
which cctv is connected identifying an agent co ing th ough
the roo door, or an nfc log entry recording the reading of a
card tag.
employe : aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: nfc1
cam r : cctv1
storage: ubs1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
S ppose that a ig tal investigation r lated to th doc
exfiltratio is initiated. An investigat r may suspect that the
do was copied onto a storage device mounted on m1 and may
formulate a hypothesis on this basis. However she is uncertain
about what exact events must have occurred for this hypothesis
to be true. H nc , s e reconstructs various scenarios about pos-
sible system vents that c uld have occurred (i.e., histories).
One possibility is that alice entered r01, performed the login
to m1, mounted usb1 on m1 and copied the doc. Another
is that bob entered the room but us d alice’s credentials to
login to m1 a d copy the file onto usb1. A more sophisticated
alternative may be that alice accessed r01 and mounted a
storage device, and she subsequently copied the doc in the
storage remotely. Each of these possibilities would require the
investigator to identify the relevant devices, search through the
records for each of these devices (e.g., logs from all readers,
cctv recordings, and hard drives for all machines) and check
if they support or refute her hypothesis.
Given the multitude of histories that could be constructed
within an environment, a sound investigati n would be depen-
den a) the inv stigators’ ability to reconstruct all possible
hist ries, b) the devices to preserve the required activities
that correspond to such histories and c) t e investigators to
examine all these against the hypotheses. As the volume of
data t analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a d pressure to deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on investigato s escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be concealed by offenders (clearing hard-
drive sy t m history) o might not be retained by a device (file
copies events), potential evidence may be lost.
Although preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence sources in the environment may seem
plausibl , xamination of large data-sets is often expensive
and time-consuming and may mask what is truly relevant for
the investigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupi s ⇠500 GB on
average. In the example, not all file copy events are relevant to
support the speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
while a st rage d vice is currently mounted. Therefore, there
is a pr ssing eed for developing systems that are forensic-
ready, i.e., that can preserve ‘relevant’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
preservation requirements be formulated precisely? 2) What
ar the system specifications that coul achieve them and can
these by synthesised automatically?
To articulate the problem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] approach to requirements definitions and satisfaction.
In their requirements reference model [], to guarantee that
a machine ac ieves its requirements R, it is necessary to
show that its specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘domain knowledge’ — descriptive assertions
about world phenomena that are true regardless of behaviour
of the machine. In our setting W comprises the environment
description E , and the speculative incident hypotheses H. The
‘specification’ S represents operational constraints over what
and when the ’machine’, must preserve having speculated
over events lying in the shared phenomena. In our case, these
specifications as operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preservation requirements are
prop rties over E , H and OS requiring OS to preserve any
event belonging to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), where RH denotes the requirement
preservations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservation requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approach for synthesising preservation specifications
from speculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the latter we assume the design choice of having a
single Controller that interacts with the individual evidence
sources and whose preservation specification we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller receives events from the digital
Hyp theses
 
no
Fig. 3. Our approach for synthesising preservation specifications.
1) History Generation. In this phase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supporting and refuting H re-
spectively. The existence of histories in ⌥+(E) ensures that
the hypotheses of interest are feasible within the intended
environment. If ⌥+(E) is empty, this means that either the
hypothesis cannot occur within the environment described,
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specification
Operational eservation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controller component
in terms of domain-specific conditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed to
satisfy preservation requirements [46]. The controlled opera-
tions for the controller are a set of preserve(a,ts) operations
where a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clock) at which the occurrence was observed by th
controller. The monitored event (and condition) are the receipt
of a notification of occurrence ca tured by the rec ive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are s before.
The domain-specific condition captures the basic state tr n-
sitions defined by the application of an operatio in the
domain. It is specified as a pair containing a domain pre-
condition (DomPre) and a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved(a, ts). Requir d con i-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened conditions
on the software-controlled operatio s that contribute to the
satisfaction of the requirements. They are expres d i the
form of required pre- and trigger- conditions. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a per i sion to
perform a preserve operation. Required trigger-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation t perform a
preserve operati . An example f operational preserva ion
requirements for the operations preserve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d, , ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
pr served(sys l gin(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer and t e
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subseque t entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage d vice.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the foren ic readiness specification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstrac ion ov r r al-time clock
variables that may be obtain d following techniqu s such as
[24], [10]. The generation of such abstractions is outside the
scope of the paper.
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an environment description E and a hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an op rat onal
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential history   = (he , ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|Ap , pr serve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS covers   for short.) It
is s id to be pr servat on c mpl t w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all pot ntial histories in ⌥+(E) and ot any history in ⌥ (E).
We say the any sp cifica ion that meets the preservation
complet n ss described abov achieves the preservation re-
quirement for H in E , denoted RH, and by abuse of notation
en t his a E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
⌥ (E)
Our p roach f r synthesising th preservation specificatio
(see Fig. 3) takes as input an environm nt description E , and a
s t of spec lative inciden potheses H, licited, for i stance,
by a domain xpert ( oftware engi eer or sec rity administra-
tor). We assume that the description of the environment is
cor t a d the sp culat ve hypothese f oncern are known
at design-time. The appro ch comprise three hase .
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A history may occur at various levels [?]. It i called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen t denote a complex history where cei is
the set of complex events occurring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environme t description E is interpreted over a sequence
of primitive and complex events (we refer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined with respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite definitions in B
according to I.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
co sider the notion of a ‘narration’ (a total order over the
partial order given i a c mplex event’s defi ition). For a
narration to be c nstructed, ach omplex event app aring i
definition is refined until all complex events are reduc d to
their primitive events and context relation lit rals. The r sult
of this refinement proc dure applied to defi ition d is a set of
composit definitions  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refined by their initiating and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narration of a d is capt red with respect to
o e of the elements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the projection of   o r primitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (r sp. Ac).
Definition 5 (Narration of Composit Definitio ): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be a behaviour description and d = hL , d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a mposite definiti n in D. Le  (d) be
the set of definitions obt ined refin ng d. A narration of d i
a hybri history   = he1, ..., hem, if there exists a d0 2  (d)
and a total order l1   ...   ln over Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote th se of primitive events
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For nstance the following are three example narrati ns for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), ent r(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relations ar interpreted over complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concur ently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event d finition histories as f llows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Give
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition e / d 2 B and a hybrid hist ry  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with respect to E if for every decompo ition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (h b)|Ac
• if d is a co posite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the set context relation literals assigned
to time-l b l l.
The environment descript on E said o be satisfied in
a h brid history if eve y complex event definiti n in B is
satisfied in that history. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histories that satisfy E .
C. Hypotheses
The term hypothesis in a digital investigation is a conjecture
that may refer, for instance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital vices, the tim span during which a system was
op rational, sy e c pabilities and c nfigurations [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus on one type of hypothesis rel-
vant to dev loping forensic-ready systems, the environ-
ment c struct on hypoth sis. This form f hypothe is pos-
tulates about the feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
ence of contextual conditions of interests. It may be cap-
ur d as an ve t’s composi e definition h / d, wh re h
is a omplex event mark g the atisfaction of a hypoth-
sis, and with Ap in d being empty and Ac and KL
contai ing only complex e en s a d cont xt r lation lit-
erals respectively. For instance the hypothesis Illega Copy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {c py(bob,doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {moun ed(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition below.
Definition 7 (Hypotheses Sati faction): A hypothesis h (with
definition h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
! at position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if there exists a decomposition
! = xyz such th t y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with r spect to d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We istinguish betw en supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and R futability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition h / d) is aid to be supportabl
i E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H s ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider th
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narrati n of the definition of Il-
yes
A his ory may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to denote a complex history where cei is
the set of complex events occurring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environment description E is interpreted over a sequence
of primitive and complex events (we refer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is deter ined wit respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite definitions in B
according to I.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
consider the not on of a ‘narration’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). F r a
narration to b constructed, eac complex vent ap earing in
a definition is refined until all complex events are reduced to
their primitive events and context relation literals. The result
of this refinement procedure applied to definition d is a set of
composite definitions  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refined by their initiati g and te minating ev nts.1
Given  (d), a narration of a d is captured with respect to
one of the elements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the pr jection of   over pri itive
(r ps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definiti n 5 (Narration of C mposite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be behaviour des ription and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composite definition in D. Let  (d) be
the set of definitions obtained refining d. A narration of d is
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, if there exists a d0 2  (d)
and a total order l1   ...   ln over Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the set f primitive vents
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For instance the following are three example narrations for
enter(ali e, r01)’s c mposite efiniti n
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access(alic , 01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s pe ca d(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relations re interpreted ver complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initk 2 I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
followi g holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We a sume histories in which
terminating an initiating events for a context relation d not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concurrently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event definitions histories as follows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition e / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with respect to E if for every decomposition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• if d is a composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL th n
 |Ac , g |= kl
wher  (l)|KL denotes the set context relation literals assigned
to time-label l.
The environment description E is said to be satisfied in
a hybrid history if every complex event definition in B is
satisfied in that history. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histories that s tisfy E .
C. Hypotheses
The term hypothesis in a igital investigation is a c njecture
that ma refer, for instance to past events in the li etim
of digital devices, the time span during which a system was
perational, system capabilit es and configurations [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus on one type of hypothesis r l-
evant to developing forensic-r ady systems, the envir -
ment construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis po -
tulates about the feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
ence of context al co ditions of interests. It may be cap-
tur d as an ev t’s composite definition h / d, where h
is a complex event marking the satisfaction of a hypoth-
esis, and with Ap in d being empty and Ac and KL
conta ning o ly c mplex events and context relatio lit-
erals respectively. For inst nce the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bob,doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mount d(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histo ies.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition bel w.
Definition 7 (Hypotheses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
defi ition h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
! at position b, i. ., !, b |= h, if there exists a d c mposition
! = xyz such that y = ea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and ord r l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish b tween suppo t ble and r futable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hyp theses Supportability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition h / d) is said to be supportable
in E if th re exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refuta le if the e xi ts a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of ybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid h story show in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yi lds a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specifi ation
Operational pr ervation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that an be erformed by the Controll r component
in terms of domain-specific co ditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed
to satisfy preservation require ents [?]. The controlled oper-
ations for the controller are a set of pres rve(a,ts) operations
wher a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-sta p instance (from the
system clock) at wh ch the occurrence was observed by the
cont ller. Th m n tored event (and c ndition) are the receipt
of a notification of occurrenc captured by the receiv (a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as befor .
The domain-specifi condition c ptures th basic state tra -
sitions d fi ed by the application of an operation in the
domain. It is specified a a pair containing a domain p -
conditi n (DomPre) and a domain ost-c n ition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved(a, ts). R quired condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture s rengthened con itions
on the s ftware-controll d op rations that contribute to the
satisfaction of the require ts. Th y are expre sed in the
form of required pre- and trigge - condit s. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions th t capture a permission to
perform preserve operation. Required trigg r-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that apture an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational p eservation
requirements for he operations pr serve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys c py(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬prese v d(sys copy(e, d, , ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy( , d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPr (pres rve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserv (sys copy(e, d,m), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
pres rved( ys login e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout( ,m), ts3)}
The above says that the ccurrence of the ev t sys copy
must be preserved by the Controlle in he storage, if th latter
already contains entri s about the occurrences of employ e’s
logging to a computer and the mounting of a storage device on
it, and no entries about employee’s logging out from computer
and unmounting of the storage device from the c mput r are
stored.
An operati nal preservation specification OS efines all ad-
missibl preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of pres rve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
th t we consider tsi to be an bs raction over real-tim clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[16], [7]. The generation of such abstr ctions is outside the
scop of the paper. We...
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an enviro ment description E and hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential istory   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
po ential log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|A , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS cover   for short.) It
is aid to b preservation complete w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potential histories in ⌥+(E) and not any hist ry in ⌥ (E).
We say the ny pecificati n that ets the preservation
completeness de ribed above ac ieves the preservation e-
quire ent for H i E , de oted RH, and by abus of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Ou pproach for s thesising the pres rvatio specification
(see Figure 3) requires as input a environment description
E , and a s t of specula ive incid nt hypo heses H that are
supportable and refu able by E . Suc inputs can be provided,
for instance, b he software ngineer. We assume hat the
d s ript on of the environment correc and the sp culative
hypotheses are kno n a-priori, before an inves igation starts.
Pres rvation specification synthesis is performed in thre
phases.
1) History Generati . In this p ase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) with respect to H. The existence
of h tories in ⌥+(E) ensures that the hypotheses of inter-
est ar feasible w thin the i t d d environment. If ⌥+(E)
is empty, this means that he it r the ypothesis cannot
occur within the nviro ment desc ibed, a d thus may t
be a security concern, o that the e vironment description
and/or the speculative hypoth ses are incorrec and eed to
be revised (e.g., by a security ad inistrator). The histories
⌥ (E) operates as a proxy f r the synthesis phase to ensure
nly relevant event occurren es are preserved.
2) S cification Verification. Given the generated ⌥+(E), we
check if the primitive history pr jection for each history is
‘covered’ by the pres rvatio specifi ation, i.e., there exists
corresponding potent al log. If this is the c se, then the
current preservation sp cificatio OS satisfies the preservation
requirem ts a d t e process terminates. If some primitive
history projection is not, then new operational preservation
specification must be synthesised in the n xt phase.
3) Specification Synt esis. The synthesis aims to learn a
new ReqPre and required trigger-conditions ReqTrighat would
prescribe th preservati n of the potential histories ⌥+(E)
and not those in ⌥ (E). The output is a set of requir d pr -
conditions . The new specificatio OS0 is given as input to the
forensic-ready controller that is respon ible for its enactment
during the system operation.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to define
and formalise preservation requirements within a software
engi eering context and to prop se an automatic means for
synthesising specifications th t atisfy t m.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating exam le is a corporate fraud incid t,
inspir d by th Gall on Grou case [19]. We co sider an
environme t within an e terp ise building, w ere two empl y-
e s, ali e and bob, w rk (see Fig. 1). bob and alice hav
laptops (m2 and m3, respectively), provided by the company.
A s nsi ive document doc is stored on the server machine 1
th t is located in the ffic r01. Ac ss to r01 is controlled
by nfc read r nd is monitored by a cctv camera. Both alice
and bob ar authorised to access 01 and to login to m1. An
incident of concern is rel ted o t e exfiltration of he doc.
Activities s ch teri g a ro m ay b ob erv d ( nferr d)
t rough low l v l system e ent that ca be bs rv d f om
digi al device , referred to as evide c sou c s. Ex mples of
l w l vel ev t can be a log entry o a extern l server to
which cctv is connected identifying an agent co ing th ough
the roo do r, or an nfc log entr recordi g the reading of a
card tag.
employe : aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
locatio : r01
reader: nfc1
cam r : cctv1
storage: ubs1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
S ppose that a ig tal inv stigation r lated to th doc
exfiltratio is initiated. An investigat r may suspect that t e
do was copi d onto a storage device mounted on m1 and may
formulate a ypothesis on this basis. However she is uncertain
about wh t exact eve ts must have occurr d for this hypothesis
to be true. H nc , s e reconstructs variou scenar os about pos-
sible system vents that c uld have occurred (i.e., histories).
On possibility is that alice entered r01, performed the login
to m1, mounted usb1 on m1 and copied the doc. Another
is that bob entered the roo but us d alice’s credentials to
login to m1 a d copy the file onto usb1. A m re sophisticated
alternative may be that alic acce sed r01 and mounted a
storage device, a d she subseque tly copied the doc in the
storage remotely. Each of these possibilities w uld r quire the
investigator to identify the relevant devic s, search through the
records for each of hese devices ( .g., logs from all re ders,
cctv recordings, and hard drives f r all machines) and c eck
if they support or refute her hypothesis.
Given the multitude of histories that could be constructed
within a environment, a sound investigation would be depen-
den a) the inv stigator ’ ability to reconstruct all possible
hist ries, b) the devices to preserve the required activities
that corr spo d to such histories and c) the inv stigators to
examine all these gainst the hypotheses. As the volume of
data t analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a d pressure to deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
ad on investigato s escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be concealed by offenders (clearing hard-
drive system history) or might not be retained by a device (file
copies events), potential evidence may be lost.
Although preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence ources in the environment may seem
lau ibl , xamin tion of l rge data-sets is often expensive
and tim -consuming d may mask w at is truly relevant for
the inve tigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a h rd drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
average. In the example, not all file copy events are relevant to
supp rt th specul tive hypothesis, but only th se taking place
while a st rage d vice is currently mounted. Therefore, there
is a pr ssi g d for d velopi g systems that are forensic-
re dy, i. ., that can preserve ‘relevant’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two question : 1) Ca
preservation requirements be formulated precisely? 2) What
are the system spec fications that could achieve them and can
the e by sy thesised aut matically?
T ar icula e the probl m, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] a proach to requir ments definitions and satisfaction.
In t eir requirements reference model [], to guarantee that
a m chine ac ieves its requirements R, it is necessary to
show that it specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘ om in knowledge’ — descriptive ass rtions
about world phenomena that are true regardless of behaviour
of the m chi e. In our setting W comprises the environment
description E , and the specula ive incident hypotheses H. The
‘s ecification’ S represents operational constraints over what
and when the ’machine’, must preserve having speculated
over events lying in the shared phenomena. In our case, these
specifi ations s operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preservation requirements are
prop rties ov r E , H and OS iring OS to preserve any
event belongi g to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), whe e RH denotes the requirement
prese vations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservation requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approac for synthesising preservation specifications
from peculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the latter we assume the design choice of having a
single Controller that interacts with the individual evidence
sources and whose preservation sp cification w synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Co troller receives events fro the digital
Hyp theses
 
no
Fig. 3. Our approach for synthesising preservation specifications.
1) H s ory Generat o . I th s phase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supporting and refuting H re-
spectively. The exist nce of histor es in ⌥+(E) ensures at
the hypotheses of interest are f asible within the intended
environment. If ⌥+(E) is e pty, this means h t eithe the
hypothesis cannot occur withi the environment describ d,
B = {                                                     }
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history show in Fig. ??, since there s a de-
composition of   that yields a narr ti n of the definiti n of Il-
legalCopy hypothe is such that  |Ac , 5 |= moun ed(usb1, 1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservat on Specificati
Operat onal preservation specifica ions OS p cify th op-
erations that can be performed by the Controll r comp ent
in terms of domain-specific c di ions, as well s additional
con traints for when op rations may and must b x cuted to
satisfy preservati equir me t [46]. Th tr lled o r -
tions for the controller are a s t of rese ve(a,ts) op rati s
where a i icates the occurrence of a pri itive ev nt i t
environment, and ts marks the ti e-st mp ins ance (from e
system clock) at which t occurrence was observed by the
controller. The monitored vent (and condition) are th receipt
of a notification of occurrence c ptured by th rec ive(a, ts)
operation where a a d ts are as befor .
The domain-specific condition captures the b si state tra -
sitions defined by the application of an operation in the
domain. It is specified as a pair containing a domain pr -
condition (DomPre) and a domain post- ondition (DomPo t),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved( , ts). Required condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened conditions
on the software-controlled operations that co tribute to th
satisfaction of the requirements. They re expressed in th
form of required pre- and trigg - conditions. R quired p -
condition (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a permissio to
perform a pres ve operation. Required trigger-c nditions (Re-
qTrig) a conditions that capture an obligation to perform a
preserve op ration. An xample of an operational preservation
requirements for the operations preserve(sys c py(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d, ), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), t )) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy( , d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < t 3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ s3 < ts4 < ts^
preserved(sys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬pres rved(sys logout(e,m), t 3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage device.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each s quence a potential log
and write it in t e form (⇡ = {pr se ve( 11 ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). T e set of potential logs admissible
by OS is noted as ⇧(OS).
We ow defi t e forensic r adin ss sp cification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstract on over real-time clock
var ables that ma be obtained followi g techniqu s such as
[24], [10] The generation f such b ract ons is outside the
scop of the p e .
Definit on 9 (P eserva i Cov age and Com leteness):
Given an nvironment de cription E and a hypothesis H that is
both suppo tabl and refut ble in E . L t OS be an opera ional
res rv t on sp c ficatio . Th OS s sa d to b cover a
tential hi tory   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if the e exi ts a
pot ntial log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), uch th t for every
a 2 (h i |Ap , pr serv (a, tsi) 2 fei (OS co ers   for sho t.) It
is s id to b pr s rv tion complete w. .t. E and H if it cove s
ll p tential hi ories in ⌥+(E) and n any h story in ⌥ (E).
We say th any pecificati n at me ts the pr serv ti n
complet nes d crib d ab ve achi ves the pr servation re-
quirement for H in E , d n ted RH, nd by abu e of notation
de o e th s as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E), ⇧+(OS), ⇧ (OS)
Our approac for synthesising t e pr servation sp cification
(s e F g. 3) tak s as inpu an envir ment description E , and a
set f pecula ive cident hypotheses H, elicited, f r instance,
by a domain expert (softw re engin er or security administra-
t r). W assume that the descri tion of the environment is
correct n th speculativ h pot e es f c nc rn are known
at design-tim . The approach comprises th e pha es.
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A h story may occur at various levels [?]. It i called a
primitive (resp. c mplex) h tory, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to denote a complex history where cei is
t s t of complex vents occurri g concurrently at position
i, nd si il rly for a p imitive history  .
n e vironment de cripti n E is interpret d ver s quence
of pri it ve and complex events (we r fer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined with respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite defi itions in B
c rd g o I.
For th satisfaction of an event’s composite defi ition, we
co sider the notion of a ‘narr tion’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). For a
narration to be constructed, ch co plex event appearing in
definition is r fined until all complex vents are re uced to
their primitive events and context relation lit r l . The resul
of this refinem nt procedure applied to definition d is a set of
composite definit o s  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refined by their initiating and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narration of a d is captured with respect to
o e of th ele e ts in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the projectio of   over rimitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definition 5 (Narration of Composite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K, , /i be a behaviour description and d hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composite definition in D. L t  (d) be
the set of definitions obtained r fining d. A narration f d is
a h brid history   = he1, ..., hem, if ther exis s a d0 2  (d)
and a total order l1   ...   ln over Ld0 uc that:
• for al li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|A = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap nd  (l)|Ac denot the set of primitive event
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For nstance the f llowing are three example narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite defi ition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), t access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(a ice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cct access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descript ons’ relatio s re interpreted over compl x
his ories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concur e tly. We now defin the satisf cti of compl x
event definitions histories as f llows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / with resp ct to E if f r every decompo ition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., h g, ..., heb a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and ord r l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• 2 (h b)|Ac
• if d is a composite d finition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL de ot the set context relation literals assigned
to tim -lab l l.
The nviro ment description E is sa d o be satisfied in
a ybrid history if very compl x event definition in B is
satisfied in that histor . We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid hi tories that satisfy E .
C. Hypoth s s
The term hypothesis in a digital investigation is a conje ture
that may refer, for i stance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital devic s, the ime span dur g which a system was
operational, syst capabilities and configurati s [?], [?].
In this pape , we focus on one type of hypothesis rel-
va to dev loping forensic-rea y systems, the environ-
ment construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis pos-
tulat s about the feasibility of vents occurrence and pres-
nce of contextual conditio s of interests. It may be cap-
tured as a vent’s composite definition h / d, where h
is a c mplex event markin the satisfaction of a h poth-
es s, and wi h Ap in d b ing empty a d Ac and KL
containing only co pl x vents and context relation lit-
erals respectiv l . Fo instance the hypoth sis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy( ob,doc,m1)}, {m unted( sb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mounted(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition below.
Definition 7 (Hyp theses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
definition h / d) is said o be satisfied in a complex hi tory
! t position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if ther exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration f
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable a d refutable hypothe-
ses i environment E .
Defi ition 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition / d) is said to be supportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such t at for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
hist ry   2 ⌥(E) such th t fo all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
yes
A history may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, d noted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear i it are primitive (resp. complex).We
writ ! = ce1, ...ce to den te a complex history where cei is
the set of compl x events occurring concurr tly at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An envir m nt d cri t on E is int rpr ted over a s q ence
f rimitive and compl x events (w refer to as a hybri
history  ). Its satisfacti n is det rmined wit respe t to th
satisfaction f c mplex eve ts’ comp site d fini ions in B
according to I.
For the s tisfaction of an vent’s composi e definition, w
consider the not of a ‘narration’ (a total ord r over the
p rtial order give in a complex event’s defi i ion). For a
narration to b cons ruct d, ea h c mplex event app aring in
a definition is r fined un il all complex vents are re uced to
their rimitiv event an contex relation lit rals. The sult
of this refinemen procedure applied to defi itio d is a et f
mposite definitions  (d). Note that cont xt r lation lit rals
are not refined by their initiating and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narr tion of a d is captured with respe t to
one of the elements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the projection of   over pri itive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definiti n 5 (Narration of Composite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i b a behaviour description and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a omposit definition in D. Let  (d) be
the set of definiti s obtained refining d. A narratio of d is
a ybri hist ry   = he1, ..., he , if there exists a d0 2  ( )
and a total order l1   ...   ln ov Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the set of primitive events
and complex events respectively assigned to time-label l.
For instance the following are three example narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite definition
 1 = ({swipe card( lice, nfc), cctv access( li e, r01, cctv1),
nter(ali e, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s pe ca d(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), nter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relations are interpreted over complex
hi tories. Giv n k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k is true at position
b i a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., ce iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concurrently. We now define the satisfactio of compl x
event definitions histories as f l ows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
in tion e / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with r spe t to E if for every decomposition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is narration o d with respect to
d0 2  (d) a d order l01 ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• f d is composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the set context lation literals assigned
to time-label l.
The environment description E is said to b a isfied in
a hyb id hi tory if very compl x vent definitio in B is
satisfied in that history. We write (E) to de ote the set of
hybr d histories that s isfy E .
C. Hyp the es
The term hypothesis i a igital inv stigation is a c njecture
that may re er, for instance, to past vents in the lifetime
of igital devices, the time s an during which a system was
operational, syst m capabilities and co figurations [?], [?].
In this pa er, we focus on one type of hypothesis rel-
van to developing forensic-ready syst ms, the environ-
ment construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis pos-
tulates about th feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
enc of contextu l conditi ns f interests. It may be cap-
tured as an event’s c mposite definition h / d, where h
i a mpl x event marking the satisf ction of a hypoth-
esis, and with Ap in d being pty and Ac and KL
containing o ly complex events and context relatio lit-
erals respectively. For instance the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bob,d c,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mou ted(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypothes s are in erpreted over finite complex histories.
Th ir s ti faction is given by the definition b l w.
Definition 7 (Hypotheses Satisfa tion): A hypothesis h (with
definition h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex history
! at position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if there exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We dis ngu h betwee supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis (w th defin ti n h / d) is said to be supportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) an t ose refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hyp the i such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportabl in E .
D. r ti l Preservation Specifi ation
Operational pr e vation specifications OS specif th op-
erations that can be p rformed by the Controll r compo ent
in terms of domain-specific co ditions, a well as additional
constr ints for when o eratio s may and ust be executed
to satisfy r s rvation r quire nts [?]. The controlled oper-
atio s for he controller are a set of p serve(a,ts) o rations
where a i di ates the ccurr nc of a prim ive event in th
environment, and ts m rks the time-sta p i stance (from the
syst m clock) at wh ch the o curre ce was bserved by th
cont ller. Th mon tored eve t (and con ition) are the receipt
of a tifi ation of occurrenc captured by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specifi condition c ptu s th ba ic state t a -
siti s d fi ed by th application of a operati n in the
domain. It is specified as a pai ntaining a domain p -
condition (DomPre) nd a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) an pr served(a, ts). Requir d c ndi-
t ons, on the o hand, captur stre gthen condi ions
on he software-controll opera ions that contribut t the
satisfaction of the require e ts. T y ar expre sed in the
fo m of equired pre- and trigger- condit s. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions th t capture a permission to
p rform pr serv peration. Req ired trigg r-conditions (R -
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation to perform a
preserve oper t . An example of an operational p es rva i
r quire e ts for h operations pr serve(sys copy( ,d,m),ts)
( or some employe e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys c py(e, d,m), t )) =
{¬pr serv d(s s c py(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(pr se ve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d, , ts)}
eqPr (pr serve( ys py(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, ,m), ts),
R qTri (preserv (sy copy( d,m), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
preserved( ys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence t e event sys copy
must be pres rve y the Contr lle in he torage, if the latter
already contains entries about the occurrences o empl yee’s
logging to a computer and the mounting of a storage device on
it, and no entries about employee’s logging out from computer
and unmounting of the storage device from the computer are
stored.
An op rati nal preservation sp cification OS defines all ad-
missibl preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by t e con-
troll r (an evic s). We call ach equ nce a potential log
a d write it in th form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissibl
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We n w defi e th fo en ic readiness spec ficati n. Note
th t we consi er tsi to be an bs raction over real-tim clock
variables that may be btained following techniqu s such as
[16], [7]. The gen ration of such abst ctions is outside the
scop f the aper. We...
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given n enviro m nt d scripti E and a hypothesis H that is
both support ble and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservatio specificati . Then OS is said to be cover a
pote ti l history   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential l g ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fe ) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS cover   for short.) It
is aid to b pr servatio omplet w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potentia histories in ⌥+(E) and not any hist ry in ⌥ (E).
We say the any specification that meets the pr servation
completen s describ d above achieves the preservation re-
quirem nt for H i E , de ted RH, and by abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Our appr ac for synth sising the r va ion specification
(see Figur 3) requires a i ut a nvironment de criptio
E , and a se of specul iv incident hypo heses H that are
supportable and refu able by E . Such inputs can be provided,
for insta ce, b he software engine r. We assum that th
description of the env ronment is correct nd the sp culative
h po ses are known a-pri ri, b for an investigation s arts.
Pre ervation specifi a ion ynt esis is pe formed in three
phases.
1) History Genera i . In this p ase, we search for hybrid
his ories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) with resp ct to H. The existence
of h tories in ⌥+(E) ensures that t e hypotheses of inter-
est are feasible w thin the i t d d environment. If ⌥+(E)
is empty, th s means that he it the ypothes s cannot
occu w thin the en ironment described, a d thus may not
be a s c rity concern, o that the environment description
and/or the speculative hypotheses are incorrect and need to
be r vised ( .g., by a security adminis rator). Th histor es
⌥ (E) op rates as a proxy for the synthesis phase to ensure
nly relevant vent occurren es are preserved.
2) S ecificati n Verification. G v n the generated ⌥+(E), w
check if the primitive hist ry pr jection for ach h story is
‘cover d’ by the preservation specification, i.e., there exists
correspondi g potentia log. If this is th c se, then the
c rrent preservati n specification OS satisfies the preservation
requirements and e process terminates. If s me primitive
hi projection is not, then new operational preservation
sp cification must be synthesised in the next phase.
3) Specification Synthesis. The synthesis aims to learn a
new ReqPre an requi d trigger-condit ons ReqTrighat would
prescribe t preservati n of t e potential histories ⌥+(E)
and not those in ⌥ (E). Th out ut is a set of requir d r -
conditions . Th new specificatio O 0 is given as input to the
forensic-ready controller that is responsible for its enactment
during the system operation.
To the be t of our knowledge, this paper is the first to d fine
a d f malise preservati n requireme ts within a so tw r
engineer context and o ro se an automatic means for
synthesi ing specifications th t atisfy t .
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our tivating exam le is a corporate fraud incid ,
i spir d by th G ll on Grou case [19]. We co sider an
environment within an e t rp ise building, where two empl y-
s, ali nd bob, w rk (s e Fig. 1). b b a d alice hav
laptops (m2 nd m3, respectively), provided by the co pany.
A s nsi ive ocument doc is stor d on the s rver machi e m1
that is oca ed n the ffice r01. Ac ess to r01 is controlled
by a nf read r and is monitored by cctv camera. B th alice
and bob re uthorised to access r01 and to login to m1. An
incid nt of c ncer is related to t e exfiltration of the doc.
Activ ties such ent ri g a room m y be bserved (inferr d)
through l w lev l system vent that can b obs rv d from
digi al d v c , r f rred to as eviden e s urc s. Ex mples of
l w level event can be a log entry on an extern l server to
which cctv is connected identifying a agent co ing ough
the roo door or an nfc log entry rec ding the reading of a
card tag.
employe : aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: nfc1
cam r : cctv1
storage: ub 1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
S ppose t at a ig tal investigation r lated to th doc
exfiltratio is initiated. An investigat r may suspect that the
do was copied onto a s orage d ice mounted on m1 and may
formulate a hypo h sis on this basi . However she uncertain
about what exact events must have occurr d for this hypothesis
be true. H nc , e rec nstructs various sc n rios ab ut pos-
ibl system vents that c uld have occurr d (i.e., histories).
One p ssibility is that alice entered r01, perfor ed the login
to m1, mou ted usb1 on m1 and copi the doc. Another
is that bob entered the room but us d alice’s credentials to
login to m1 a d copy the file onto usb1. A more sophisticated
alternative may be that alice accessed r01 and mounted a
storage device, and she subsequently copied the doc in the
storage remotely. Each of these possibilities would require the
investigator to identify the relevant devices, search through the
records for each of th se devices (e.g., log from all readers,
cctv recordings, and hard drives for all machines) and check
if they support or refute her hypothesis.
Giv the ultitude of histories that could be co structed
withi an e ironment, sound investigation would e depen-
den a) the inv tigato s’ abili y to reconstruct all possible
hi t ries, b) the dev ces to preserve the required activities
that correspond to such ist ri s and c) the investigators to
exami e all these against the hypotheses. As the volume of
data analy e is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a pr ssure to deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on investigato s escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be conce led by offenders (clearing hard-
drive ystem hi tory) or might not be retained by a device (file
copies events), potential evidence may be lost.
Although preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence sources in the environment may seem
plausibl , xamination of large data-sets is often expensive
a time- onsuming and may mask what is truly relevant for
the investigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
average. In th example, not all file copy events are relevant to
support the speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
wh l a st rage d vice is currently mounted. Ther fore, there
is a pr ssing eed for developing systems that are forensic-
ready, i.e., that can preserve ‘releva t’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
preservation requi ements b formulated precisely? 2) What
are the system specifications that could achieve them and can
these by synthesised automatically?
To articulate the problem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] approach to requirements definitions and satisfaction.
In their requir ments reference model [], to guarantee that
a machine ac ieves its requireme ts R, it is necessary to
sh w that its specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘domain knowledge’ — descriptive assertions
about world ph nomena that are true regardless of behaviour
of the machine. In our setting W comprises the environment
description E , and the speculative inci ent hypotheses H. The
‘specification’ S represents operational constraints over what
and when the ’machin ’, must preserve having sp culated
over events lying i the shared phenomena. In our case, these
specifications as operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preserva ion requirements are
p op rties ove E , H and OS r quiring OS to preserve any
vent belonging to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), where RH denotes the requirement
preservations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservation requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approach for synthesising preservation specifications
from speculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the latter we assume the design choice of having a
single Controller that interacts with the individual evidence
sources and whose preservation specification we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller receives events from the digital
Hyp theses
 
no
Fig. 3. Our approach for synthesising preservation specifications.
1) History Generation. In this phase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supporting and refuting H re-
spectively. The existence of histories in ⌥+(E) ensures that
the hypotheses of interest are feasible within the intended
environment. If ⌥+(E) is empty, this means that either the
hypothesis cannot occur within the environment described,
Fig. 3. Our approach for sy th s ing pr s vation p cifi ions.
1) Hi t ry Ge era ion. I this se, we sear f r y rid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supp ti g d r futing H r -
spectively. The existence of hist ri s ⌥+(E) nsur tha
the ypotheses of interest ar feasib wit i the i t d
e vir nm nt. If ⌥+(E) is mpty, this m ans t a eit r th
hypothesis cann t occur withi t e nvir n ent d cr be ,
and thus t will not requir d o b c sid red during a d gital
investigation, or that he environment d scripti n an / r t e
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some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specification
erati al preservation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controller component
in terms of domain-specific conditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed to
satisfy preservation requirements [46]. The controlled opera-
tions for the controller are a set of preserve(a,ts) operations
where a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clock) at which the occurrence was observed by the
controller. The monitored event (and condition) are the receipt
of a notification of occurrence captured by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specific condition captures the basic state tran-
sitions defined by the application of an operation in the
domain. It is specified as a pair containing a domain pre-
condition (DomPre) and a domain post-condition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved(a, ts). Required condi-
tions, on the other hand, capture strengthened conditions
on the software-controlled operations that contribute to the
satisfaction of the requirements. They are expressed in the
form of required pre- and trigger- conditions. Required pre-
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a permission to
perform a preserve operation. Required trigger-conditions (Re-
qTrig) are conditions that cap ure an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational preservation
requirements for the operations preserve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
Req re( reserve(sys c y(e, , ), ts))
{receive (sys c y(e, , ), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
preserved(sys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above says that th occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage devic .
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstraction over real-time clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[24], [10]. The generation of such abstractions is outside the
scope of the paper.
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an environment description E and a hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential history   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential lo ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for e ery
a 2 (hei)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS covers   for short.) It
is said to be pres rvation c mpl te w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potential histories in ⌥+(E) and not any history in ⌥ (E).
W s y the any specification that meets the preservation
completeness described ab ve achieves the preservati n e-
quirement for H in E , denoted RH, and by abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PR SERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E), ⌥ (E)
Our approach for synthesising the preservation specification
(see Fig. 3) takes as input an environment description E , and a
set of speculative incident hypoth ses H, elicited, for instance,
by a domain expert (software engineer or security administra-
tor). We assum that the description of the e vir m t is
correct an th sp culati e hyp th se f co r are know
at design-time. The appr a c mp is s thr e has s.
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to define
and formalise preservation requirements within a software
engineering context and to propose an automatic means for
synthesising specifications tha satisfy them.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our m tivating exampl is a corporate fraud incident,
inspired by the Galleon Group case [19]. We consider an
environment within an enterprise building, where two employ-
ees, alice and bob, work (see Fig. 1). bob and alice have
laptops (m2 and m3, respectively), provided by the company.
A sensitive document doc is stored on the server machine m1
that is located in the office r01. Access to r01 is controlled
by a nfc reader and is monitored by a cctv camera. Both alice
and bob are authorised to access r01 and to login to m1. An
incident of concern is relate to the xfiltration of the doc.
Activities such entering a room may be obser ed (inferred)
through low level system events that can be observed from
digital devices, referred to as evidence sources. Examples of
low level events can be a log entry on an external server to
which cctv is connected identifying an agent coming through
the room door, or an nfc log entry recording the reading of a
card tag.
employee: aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 laptop: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: nfc1
camera: cctv1
storage: ubs1 
F g. 1. Setting of our motivating xample.
Suppose that a digital investigatio rel ted to e doc
exfiltration is initiat . An i e tigato m suspec that
doc was copied onto a storag device mou ted o m1 and may
formulate a hypothesis o th s ba is. H wever she is un rt in
about what exact eve ts ust have oc urred fo this hypothesis
t be true. He ce, he reco stru ts v rious sc nari a ut pos-
sible system events hat o ld have oc r d ( . ., hist ri s).
One possibility is that alic nter d r01, p rform d he l gi
to m1, mou ted usb1 on m1 and c ied t doc. An ther
is tha bob entere th ro but us d alice’s cre ials t
login to m1 and opy th file n usb1. A re sophisticated
alternative may be that lic acc ss 01 mou ted a
storage d vice, and she subsequ tl opi he do in the
storage remot ly. Each f th se pos ibiliti s w uld require the
investigator to identify t relevan devices, se r h through h
records for each of these devi es ( .g., l gs from all readers,
cctv recordings, and hard drives for all m chi es) a d check
if th y support or refute her hyp thesi .
Given the multitude of histories that could be constructed
within an environment, a sound investigation would be depen-
dent on a) the investigators’ ability to reconstruct all possible
histories, b) the devices to preserve the required activities
that correspond to such histories and c) the investigators to
examine all these against the hypotheses. As the volume of
data to analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
and pressure t deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on investigators escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be concealed by offenders (clearing hard-
drive system history) or might not be retained by a device (file
copies events), potential evidence may be lost.
Although preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence sources in the environment may seem
plausible, examination of large data-sets is often expensive
and time-consuming and may mask what is truly relevant for
the investigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
average. In the example, not all file copy events are relevant to
support the speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
while a storage device is currently mounted. Therefore, there
is a pressing need for developing systems that are forensic-
ready, i.e., that can preserve ‘relevant’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
preservation r quirements be formulated precisely? 2) What
are he sys m specific tion that could achieve them and can
these by synthesised automatically?
To articulate the p oblem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] approach to requirements definitions and satisfaction.
In thei requirements ref rence m del [], to guarantee that
a machine achieves its requirements R, it is necessary to
show that its specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘domain knowledge’ — descriptive assertions
about w rld phenomena that e true regardless of behaviour
of the m chine. In o r s ti g W omprises the environm nt
d s i t o E , and the spe ulative incide t hypotheses H. The
‘specificat on’ S epres nts op rational constrai ts over what
n wh n ’m chin ’, mus pre rve having speculat d
over ev ts ly g n th shared p no na. In our case, these
specification as operational preserv t on specifications, OS.
W th this fra f min , the pre ervation requirements are
properti s ov r E , H and OS requiring OS to preserv a y
v nt belo ing to an history th t sh ws how E may satisfy
H( . ., E , H OS |= RH), wh re RH denotes the requirem nt
res rvati ns w th respect o hypo ese H.
Se t on IV formalises th c ncepts ne ed for defining the
pres rv tio requi ment probl preciesly. Section V pro-
p e an approach fo sy hesising preservation specifications
from sp culated hypothe es and nvir nment descriptions.
For th latter we ssum th de ign choice of having a
single Controll r that nteracts with the individual evidence
sourc a d w os pre ervati n specifi at on we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller r ceives events from the digital
no
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some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists
i t   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid hi ory shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composi ion of   that yields a narration of the definiti n of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservati Specification
Operational preservation specificati ns OS specify the op-
erations that can be perform d by the Con roller ne t
in terms of domain-specific c nditions, a well a additio al
constraints for when operations may and mus be ex cu to
satisfy preservation requireme s [46]. The contro le op a-
tions for the controller are a s t of pre erve(a,ts) ope ati s
where a indicates the ccurr nce of a primitive ve in th
environment, a d ts marks the time- mp in tanc (fr m th
s stem clock) t which the ccurrence was bs rved by th
controller. The monitored event (an c itio ) r the r c i t
of a notification of occu rence captured by the ce ve(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as fore.
The domain-specific condition cap ur he basic st tra -
sitions defined by th application of a op ra i n i t e
d main. It is pe ified as a pair contai ing a domain pre-
condition (DomPre) nd a domain post-c dition (D mP st),
.g., ¬p served(a, ts) and pres rve (a, ts). Required c ndi-
tions, on the other hand, captu stre gthen d co dition
on the software-controlled ope ations th t contribute the
satisfaction of the requirements. They ar expressed in th
form of required pre- and trigger- conditi ns. Required pr -
conditions (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a permission to
perform a preserve operation. Required trigger-c ndi ons (R -
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligati n o perf rm a
preserve peration. An example of an operational reservation
requirements for the operations pr serve(sys copy(e,d,m),t )
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomP e(p eserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy( , d,m, s)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s S r.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 ts4 < ts^
pres rved(sys login( d,m), ts1)^
res rved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e m ts3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if th controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employ e’s logging onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the storage device.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operati ns that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in th form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The set of pot ntial logs admissible
by OS is d not d as ⇧(OS).
We now define th for nsic read ss sp ification. Note
that we consider tsi to be an abstract n over real-time clock
variables that may be obtained following te hniq es such as
[24], [10]. The g eration of such abstractions is outside the
scope of the p per.
Definition 9 (Preservatio Coverage nd Completeness):
Given an environm nt description E and a hypothesis H that is
both support bl nd r futabl in E . L t OS be operational
p eservati n pecificati . Then OS is said to be co r a
potential hist ry   = (h 1, ..., hen 2 ⌥+(E), if there exis s a
p ential og ⇡ = (fe1, ..., f n) 2 ⇧(OS) su h th t for ev ry
2 (hei)|Ap , r serv ( , tsi) 2 f i (O covers   for short.) It
is said be pr servation compl te w.r.t. E and H i t covers
ll pote tial his ories in ⌥+(E) and not any history in ⌥ (E).
We say the y specifi atio that ee s the prese ati n
c mpleten ss described b ve achieves th preservation re-
quirement for H in E , d n t d RH, and by abuse f notation
denote s E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVA ION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E)
Our ap o ch f r ynthesising t e p ervation specification
(see Fig. 3) takes s inpu an nvironm t d scription E , and a
s t f speculative incid nt ypotheses H, eli ited, for ins ance,
by a domain expert (s ftwar ngi e r or security administra-
t r). W assum that the scription of t nvir m nt is
correct and the spe lative ypothes s of concer are known
at design-t me. The appr ach comprise three p as .
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A history may ccur at vari us levels [?]. It i called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denot d   (resp. !), if all
the events that ap ear in it are primitiv (resp. complex).We
wr te ! = ce1, ..cen to denot a compl x history ere ce is
the set of complex v ts o curring concurrently a position
i, nd simil rly for primitive history  .
An environm t d scription E is interpreted over a sequence
of primitive a d complex events ( e ref to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determine with r s ect to the
satisfaction of om lex eve ts’ composite defi itions in B
according to I.
For the satisfacti n of an event’s composite definition, we
consid r the notion of a ‘ arration’ (a total order over the
partial ord r given in a com lex e nt’s d finition). For a
arration to be constructed, ach complex ev nt app aring in
a definition is refined until all complex events are r duced to
their primitive events and context relation lit r ls. The result
of this refin ment procedure lied to definiti is a et of
composite defin tions  (d). Note that c ntext re ation lit r ls
are not r fined by t ir i itiati g and terminating events.1
Given  (d), a narration f a d i ca ured with r spect o
o e of the lements in  (d). We will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to den te the projection of   ver primitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Defi itio 5 (Narration of Composite D fi iti n): L t B=
hA ,Ac,K,D, /i be a beh viour description and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KL i a co posite definitio in D. Let  (d) b
the set of d finiti ns obtaine refini g d. A narration of d is
a h brid history   = e1, ..., h m, if there xists a d0 2  (d)
and a total or r l1   ...   ln over Ld0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (h a)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the se of primitive events
an complex events respectively assigned to im -label l.
For nstance the f llowing are three exam le narrations for
enter(alic , r01)’s compo ite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nf ), cctv ac ess(alic , r01, cctv1),
nter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alic , r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1 }1,
{swipe c rd(alic , nf ), ent r(al ce, r01)}2)
Context description ’ relati s are interpreted over complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 c a ^ 8g 2 N , TRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise it is said to be false. We ssume histories in which
termi ating and i itiati g events for a ontext relati n do ot
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for btainin  (d).
occur concur ently. We ow define the satisfaction of c mplex
event defin tions istori s as f llows.
Definition 6 (C mplex Ev nt Definition Satisfactio ): Given
a environm t description E=(B,C,I), a complex event d f-
nition e / d 2 B an a hybri history  ,   is said t satisfy
e / d with respect to E if for every decompo ition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with resp ct t
d0 2  (d) and or er l01   ...   l0j   ..   l0n the :
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• f d is a composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denote the set cont xt relat o lit r ls as igned
to tim -l bel l.
The environm t description E is said o be satisfi d in
a hyb id history if ever compl x event defini i n in B is
satisfied in that hi tory. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histori s t at satisfy E .
C. H pothes s
The ter hypothesis in a digital i vestigation is a conjecture
that may refer, for instance, to past events in the lifetime
of digital devices, th time span during which a system was
peratio al, syste capabilities and c nfigurati s [?], [?].
In this pa er, we focus on e type of h othesis rel-
eva t to dev loping forensic-ready syst ms, the e viron-
ent construction hypothesis. This form of hypothesis s-
tulate about the feasibility of events occurrence and pres-
ence of contextual conditions f inter sts. It may be cap-
ured s an even ’s co posite efinition h / d, re h
is com lex vent m rking the satisfaction f a hyp th-
esis, and with Ap in d being empty and Ac KL
containing only complex events and context relation lit-
als resp ctively. For i stance the hypo sis IllegalCo y
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bo ,d c,m1)}, { ounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mo nted(usb1,m1), copy(bob,d c,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histori s.
Their satisfaction is given by the definition below.
Definition 7 (Hy th ses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
defini ion h / d) is said to be satisfied in a complex ist ry
! at po ition b, i. ., !, |= h, if ther exists a d comp sition
! = xyz such t at y = c a, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narr tion of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and or er l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL t n  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable a d refutable hypoth -
ses in environm t E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Su p rtability and Refut bility):
Let ⌥(E) be the set of hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with definition h / d) is said to be supp rtable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such th t for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutabl if there xists a
history   2 ⌥ E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of ybrid histori s in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history sh n in Fig. ??, since there is a d -
compositio of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
yes
A history may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (resp. complex) histor , denoted   (resp. !), if all
th events that appear in it ar primitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to enot a compl x history where cei is
the set of complex events oc ur ing concurr ntly at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environment description E is interpreted ov r a sequenc
of primitive and complex ven s (w refer to as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined wit respect to the
satisfa t on of compl x event ’ compos te definitions in B
acc rding to I.
For the satisfaction of an event’s composite definition, we
consider th not on of a ‘narration’ (a tot l order ov r the
parti l or er giv n in a complex vent’s definition). For a
narration to be constru ted, ach complex e nt app aring i
a defin tion is refi ed until all complex events are reduced to
their pri iti events and c text relat on literals. The result
of this refinement procedur applied t defi ition d is a se f
co posit defi iti s  (d). Note that context relation literals
are not refine b their initia ing and terminating events.1
Given  ( ), a narr tion of a is captured with respect to
one of the elements i  (d). We will use the notati n  |A
(r ps.  |Ac ) to denote the pr j ction of   ov r rimitive
(reps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definition 5 (Narration of Composite Definition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be a b h viour description and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composite definitio in D. Let  (d) b
the t of definitions obtained refining d. A narration of is
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, if there exists a d0 2  (d)
and a tot l rder l1   ...   ln ove Ld0 s ch that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then a < b (where 1 
a, b  m ,
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•   0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap an  (l)|Ac de ote the set of primitiv event
an compl x ev nts re pectively assign to time-label l.
For instan e the following re three example narratio for
nter(alice, r01)’s composit definition
 1 = ({swipe card(al ce, nfc), cctv acc ss(alice, r01, cctv1),
nter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s e ca d(alice, nf )}1, ,
{cctv acce s(alic , r01, cctv1), enter(al ce, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe car (alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Context descriptions’ relati ns are interpreted over complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initk 2 I, k is true at positio
b in a complex history ! = e1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! e Rk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
o herwis it is s id to be false. We assume histories in w ch
terminating and initiating eve ts for a c ntext relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concurrently. We now define the satisf ction of complex
event definitions histories as follows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex ev nt def-
inition e / d 2 B and a h brid istory  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with respect t E if for every decomposition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• if d is a composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the s t co text relatio literals assigned
to time-label l.
The enviro ment description E is said to be satisfied in
a hybrid istory if every complex event definition in B is
s tisfie in that hist ry. We wr e ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hyb id histories that s tisfy E .
C. Hypot eses
The term hypothesis in a igital investigation is a c njecture
that may refer, for i stance, to past eve ts in the life me
f digital devices, the time span during which a system was
op rational, sys em ca bilities and config rations [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus on one type of hy othesis rel-
evant to d veloping forensic-ready systems, the environ-
m n const ucti n hypothesis. This f rm of hypoth sis pos-
tulates about the f asibility of ev nts oc rrence and pres-
ence of contextual conditi ns of interests. It may be cap-
tur d as an vent’s co posite defi ition h / d, where h
is c mpl x event m rking the atisfaction f a hypoth-
esis, a d ith Ap in d being empty nd Ac and KL
co taining o ly c mplex ev nts and context relatio l t-
erals respectively. For instance the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy( ob,doc,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mounted(usb1,m1), copy(bo ,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypothes s a i t rpreted ov r finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is giv n by the definition below.
Definiti n 7 (Hypotheses Satisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
d finiti n h / d) i s id to be satisfied in a complex history
! at positi n b, i.e., !, b |= h, if ther exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., c b that is a narration of
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and rder l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2   0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish etwee upportabl an refutable hypothe-
s s environ e t E .
Definition 8 (Hypotheses Supportabili y and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the set brid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis (with d fin tion h / d) is said to b upportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such th t for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be efutable if there exists a
h story   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid hi tories in ⌥(E) upporti g
H as ⌥+(E) and those r f ing it ⌥ (E). Consider the
po ential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since ther is a de-
composition of   t at yields a narration of the definitio of Il-
legalCopy hyp thesi suc that  |Ac , 5 |= mount d(usb1, 1),
then IllegalCopy is supporta le in E .
D. Operational Preser ation Specifi ation
Operational pr ervation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that can be perform d by the Contr ll r component
in term of domain-specific co ditions, as well as dditional
con traints for wh n operatio s may an must be execut d
to s tisfy pr se vation require ents [?]. The controlled op -
ati s for the controller are a et of pres rve(a,ts) o era ions
where a indicates the ccurrence of a primitive vent in the
environment, and ts marks the time-stamp instance (from the
system clo k) at wh ch the occurrence was observed by the
cont ller. The mon t red event (and c ndition) are the re eipt
of a n tification of occ renc captur d by the receive(a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as before.
The domain-specifi condition c tur s th basic st te tra -
siti s d fi ed by th ap licat on of an operation in the
dom in. It is specified a pai containing a domain p -
condition (DomPre) and a doma n po t-condition (DomPo t),
e.g., ¬pr rved( , t ) a d pres rv ( , ts). R quired condi-
tions, on th othe hand, capture str gthe ed c dition
n s ftware-controlled op rations at co tribute o the
satis act on of th requ re nts. Th y are xpressed in the
form of equ r d pre- and trigger- condit s. Requ red pre-
conditions (ReqPre) a nditions th t captur a p rm sion o
perform pres rve operation. Req ired trigger-condi s (Re-
qTrig) are co ditions that capt re an obligation to perform a
preserve operation. An example of an operational p eservation
requirements for he operations pr ser e(sys copy(e,d,m),t )
(for some employ e e, docu ent d and co puter m) is
omPre(preserve(sys c py(e, d, ), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
DomP t(pr serve(sys copy( , d,m), )) =
{preserv d(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserv (sys c py( , ,m), ts)) =
{rec ive (sys copy e, d,m), ts),
Re Trig(pres rv (sys copy(e, d,m), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, t 4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < s3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < ts4 < ts^
pres rve ( ys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
p rved(sys mou t(s, ), ts2)^
¬pres rved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The above say that the occurrence of th event sys copy
must be preserved by the Controller i he storage, if the latter
already contains entries about the occurrences of employee’s
logging to com uter and th mounti g of a storage evice on
it, and no entries abou emplo ee’s logg ng out from computer
and unmounting of th storage device fro the computer are
stored.
An operati nal pr servation s ecification OS defines all ad-
missibl preservation capacities (potential lo s) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and evices). We call each sequ nce a p tential log
and w te it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{prese ve(a1 , tsm)}m). The set of potential l gs ad issible
by OS is en ted as ⇧(OS).
W now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
th t we consider tsi o be an bs raction over real-tim clock
variables t t may be obtained following techniques such as
[16], [7]. The generation of such abstr ctions is outside the
scop of the paper. We...
Definitio 9 (Preservation Coverage and Co pleteness):
Given an environment description E nd a hypothesis H that is
both supportabl and r futabl in E . Let OS be operati al
r serva ion specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
pot ntial history   = (he1, ..., he ) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
potential log ⇡ = (fe1, ..., fe ) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
2 (h i)|Ap , preserve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS cover   for sh rt.) It
is aid to b preservat on complete w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potential histori s in ⌥+(E) and not any history in ⌥ (E).
We say the any sp cification that meets the preservation
completeness described above ac ieves th preserv tion e-
quireme t for H i E , de oted RH, and b abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SP CIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Our approach for synt sising the preservation specification
(see F gure 3) r quires as input an nvironm nt des ripti n
E , and a et of sp culative incident hypotheses H that are
upport ble and refu able by E . Such inputs can be provided,
for instance, b the softw re engin er. We assume that the
description of the environment is correct and the sp culative
hypotheses are known a-priori, before an i vestigation starts.
Pr servation specification synthesis is performed in three
phases.
1) His ry G neratio . I this p ase, we search for hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) a d ⌥ (E) with re pect to H. T e xistence
of h t rie in ⌥+(E) ens res that the yp theses of inter-
e t re fe sible w th n the int d d nviron ent. If ⌥+(E)
is empty, this mea s that the it r t e ypothesis cann t
occur within he nvironm nt described, and thus may not
b a security concern, o that the nvironment description
and/or t e speculativ hypotheses are inc rrect and need to
be revi ed (e.g., y a security admin strator). The histories
⌥ (E) operat s as a proxy for the synthesis phase to ensure
nly releva event occurren es are preserved
2) Specificati n V rification. Given the generate ⌥+(E), we
check if the pr mitiv is ry pr jection for each history is
‘covere ’ by the preservation sp cificatio , i.e., th re exists
c r e po ding tential log. If thi is h c se, then the
urrent pres rvati n specification OS satisfi the preservation
requ rement and the process terminate . If some pri itive
history projection is not, then new perati nal reservation
pecification must be synthesised in the next phase.
3) S ecific ti Synt esis. The synth is aims to learn a
ew ReqPr an r quir d trigger-conditions ReqTrighat would
p escribe th pres rvati n of the otential histori s ⌥+(E)
and ot those in ⌥ ( ). The output is a set of r quir d pr -
conditio s . The new specificatio OS0 is given as inp to the
foren ic-r ady controll r that is respon ible for its enactment
during the system operation.
To the best of our knowledg , this paper is the first to define
and f rmali e preservation req irements within a sof war
engineering context and to prop se an automatic means f r
ynthesising sp cifications th t atisfy t m.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating exam le is a corp rate fraud incid t,
in i d by th G lleon Grou case [19]. W co sider an
nvironment within an e terp s building, where tw empl y-
e s, ali and bob, w rk (see Fig. 1). bob and alice have
laptops (m2 and 3, resp ctively), pr vided y the company.
A s nsi ive document doc s s or d on the erver m chine m1
that is l cated n t e ffic r01. Ac ess to r01 is controlled
by a nfc read r an i monito d by a cctv cam a. B th alice
bob are authorised to acc ss 01 and to l gin to m1. A
incide of conc rn is r l t d to t e exfiltration of th doc.
Ac ities s ch enteri g r om may b obs rved (inf rr d)
through low level s em ve t that can be obs rv d from
digi l devices, ref rr d to as vidence urc . xampl s of
l w level events can be a log try on an extern l server to
which cctv i co nected i ntifying an gent co ing th ough
h roo door, or an nfc log e try recording th r ading of
card tag.
employ : aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 lapt p: m3
d sktop: m1
file: doc
locati : r01
r ader: nfc1
cam r : cctv1
st rage: u s1 
Fig. 1. S t ng f ou motivating ex mple.
S ppo e that a ig tal i vestigation el ted o th doc
xfiltratio is initiat . An investigat r may susp ct th t the
o wa copied onto a storage d vice mounted on m1 a d may
formulate a hypothesis on this basis. However she is uncertain
about what exact events must have occurred for this hypothesis
to be true. H nc , s reconstructs va ious scenari s about pos-
sible system v nts that c uld have ccurred (i.e., i tories).
On possibility is th t lice enter d r01, perform d the login
to m1, m unted usb1 on m1 and copie the doc. Another
i that bob entered the room but us d alice’s credenti ls to
login to m1 a copy the file onto usb1. A more sophi ticated
alternative may be that alice accessed r01 and mounted
storage device, and she subsequently copied the doc in the
storage remot ly. E ch of these possibilities would require the
investigator to identify th relevant devices, se rch through th
records for each of these devices (e.g., logs from all readers,
cctv record gs, and hard drives for all machines) and check
if they support or refute her hypothesis.
Given the multitude of histories that could be constructed
within an environment, a sound investigati n would be depen-
den a) th inv stigators’ ability to reconstruct all possible
hist ries, b) the devices to preserve the required activities
that correspond to such histories and c) t e investigators to
examine all these against the hypotheses. As the volume of
data t analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a d pressure to deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on investigato s escalates, making way for evidence and
negative biases to go u noticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices c uld be concealed by offenders (clearing hard-
drive syst m hist ry) o might not be retained by a device (file
copies event ), potenti l evidence may be lost.
Alth ugh preserving all events that can be observed from
potential evidence sources in t environment may seem
pl u ibl , xamination of large data-sets is often expensive
and tim -consuming and may mask what is truly relevant for
the investigation. For ex mple, 60 days cctv f o ages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupi s ⇠500 GB on
average. In the example, not all file copy events are relevant to
upport he speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
while a st rage d vice is currently mounted. Therefore, there
s pr ssing e d f r developing systems that are forensic-
r ady, i. ., hat an preserve ‘relevant’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
preservation requirements be formulated precisely? 2) What
are the system specifications that coul achieve them and can
these by synthesised automatically?
T arti ulate he problem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] approach to requi ements definitions and satisfaction.
In their requirements reference model [], to guarantee that
a machin ac ieves its requirements R, it is necessary to
show at ts spe ifica ion S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
captures some ‘domain kn wledge’ — descriptive assertions
about world ph omena that are true regardles of behaviour
of the machine. In our setting W comprises the environment
descript on E , and the speculative incident hypo heses H. The
‘specifi ation’ S r p esents operational constraints ov r wh t
and hen the ’machine’, must preserve having speculated
over events lying in the shared phenomena. I our case, these
specifications as operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame f mind, the preservation requirements are
pr p rties over E , H and OS requiring OS to preserve any
event belonging to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i. ., E , H,OS |= RH), where RH denotes the requirement
pr servations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservation requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approach for synthesising preservation specifications
from speculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the l tter we assume the design choice of having a
single Controller that interacts with the individual evidence
sources and whose preservation specification we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller receives events from the digital
Hyp these
 
no
Fig. 3. Our approach for synth sising pres rvation sp cific ti s.
1) Hist ry Generation. In this phase, we search for hybrid
hist ries ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supporting and refuting H re-
spectively. T xistence of histories in ⌥+(E) ensures that
the hypotheses of interest are feasible within the intended
environment. If ⌥+(E) is empty, this means that either the
hypothesis cannot occur within the environment described,
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It s said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) suc that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and hose refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
p tential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since there is a de-
composition of   that yields a narration of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis uch that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then I legalCopy is supp rtable in E .
D. O erational Pre erva ion Spe ification
Operational eservation pecific ions OS s ecify the op-
erations that can be performed by the Controller compone t
in terms of dom in-specific conditions, as well as additional
constra nts f r when op rations may and must be ex cuted to
satisfy preservation requirements [46]. The contr lled opera-
tions for the controller are a se f preserve(a,ts) oper tions
where a indicat s the occurrence of a primitive even i the
environm nt, and ts ma ks the time-stamp ins anc (from the
system clock) at which the occurrence was observ d by th
controller. The monit red event (and conditi ) ar the receip
of a notification of occurrence ca ured by the re eive(a, ts)
operation wher a d ts are s before.
The domain-specific condi ion captures he basic state tr n-
sitions defined by the appli tion of an ope atio in t
domai . It is specified a a p ir contain ng a dom in pre-
condition (DomPre) and a d main post-condition (D mPost),
e.g., ¬pres rved(a, ts) and preserved( , ts). Re uir d con -
tions, on the other hand, c pture stre th e condition
on he software-controlled op rati t at c tribute t the
satisfaction of the requirem nts. They are xpres d i the
form of required pre- and trigger- con i i ns. Requir pre-
conditi ns (R qPre) are conditions tha capture a per i i n to
perform a preserve ope ation. Required t igger-condit s (R -
qTrig) are conditions that capture an obligation t perfo m a
preserve op rati . An example f o eration l pres rva i n
requirements for th operations preserve(sys copy(e,d, ),ts)
(for some empl yee e, document and compu er m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{¬preserved(sys copy(e, d, , ts)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(preserve(sys c py(e, d,m) ts)) =
{received(sys co y(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Cl ck, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < 4 < ts^
pr served(sys l gin(e, d,m), ts1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬pres rved(sys logout(e,m), s3)}
The above says that the occurrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if the controller already preserved infor-
mation about an employee’s logging onto a computer a d t e
mounting of storage d vice on it, but not a subseque t ntry
about his/her logging out or unmounting of the torage d vice.
An operational res rvati specification OS define all ad-
miss ble preserv tion capacities (po e tial logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We call each sequence a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {pr serve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{ (a1m, tsm)}m). The set of pot ntial logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the foren ic readin s specification. Note
that w consider tsi to be an abstrac ion ov r r al-time clock
variables that m y be obtain d following techniqu s such as
[24], [10]. The gen ratio of such ab tractions is utside the
scop of the aper.
Definition 9 (Preserv tion Cover ge and Compl teness):
Give an environm nt description E d a hypoth is H that is
b th support ble and refutable in E . Let OS be an op rat onal
pr s rvation pecification. Then OS is said to b cover a
pot nt al hist ry   = (he , ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E , if th r xist a
potential log ⇡ = (f 1, ..., f ) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for very
a 2 (hei)|Ap , pr serve(a, tsi) 2 fei (OS covers   for sh t.) It
i s id o b pr s rvat o c mpl t w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all pot ntial hist r in ⌥+(E) nd t any ist ry in ⌥ (E).
W say the any sp cifica ion t at me the p e ervation
co l t des ribed abov achie s th pr servat re-
quir me t for H in E , de oted RH, and by abuse of o ati
en t i a E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
⌥ (E)
Our p oach f r synthe isi g th p s vati p cific ti
(s e Fig. 3) t k s as in ut an n ir m nt escription E , a d a
s t f spec ati inciden p thes s H, lic ted, f r i stance,
by domain expert ( oftware gi r r s c ri y dmin stra-
t r). We assume that the descr p ion of t e e vironmen is
c r ct d h sp cula v hyp these f onc rn are k own
t sign-t me Th ppro ch comp is three has .
 yes {            ,             }
Softwar
Engineer
History 
G neration
1
yes {            }
R vise 
Pr s rvation S ecific i  Synth sis o
Specification
V rification
Sp ification
Synth sis
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A history may occur at various l vels [?]. It i called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are primitive (res . complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen t denote a complex history where cei is
the set of complex events ccurring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environme t descripti n E is in rpreted over a sequence
of primitive and complex events (we refer t as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfac is determined with resp ct to the
satisfacti n of c mplex events’ composite definiti ns i B
according to I.
F r the satisfaction of an eve ’s composite definition, we
co sider the notion of a ‘narration’ (a to al order over the
partial order given i a c mplex vent’s d fi ition). For a
narratio to be nstruct d, a ompl x ven app aring i
efini ion is refined until all c mplex v nts re redu d to
their primitive events a d co ext rel tion lit rals. The r sult
of this r fi eme t proc dure applied t definition d is a set of
composit defi itions  (d). Note that c ntext rel tion literals
are n t refined by their initiat ng and te mi ating eve s.1
Give  (d), a n rr tion of a d is capt red with spect to
e of he elements in  (d). W will us th notatio  |Ap
(r ps.  |Ac ) to denot the proj ct o of   o mitive
(reps. complex) ev nts in Ap (r sp. Ac).
Definiti 5 (Na rat n of Comp sit D finition): L t B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be a behaviour description and d = hL , d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KL i a mposite definition in D. Le (d) be
the set of definiti ns obt ined r fin ng . A na ration of d i
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, f there exist a d0 2  (d)
and a t tal orde l1   ...   ln over L 0 such that:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , f li   lj the < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = ( )|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote th se f primitiv events
and complex vents r spectiv ly assigned to tim -label l.
For nstance the following are thre example narra i ns for
e ter alice, r01)’s com osite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, f ), cctv ccess(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1), ent r( lice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter(alice, r01)}2)
Cont x descriptions’ relati ns ar in rpr ted ver complex
histories. Given k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki I, k is true at position
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eINk 2 cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwis it is said to be false. We assum histories in which
terminating and i it ting ev nts for cont xt relation d not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concur ently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event d finition histories as f llows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Give
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
initio e / d 2 B and a ybrid hist ry  ,   is said to sati fy
/ d with respect to E if for very decomp ition   = yz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) a d r er l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (h b)|Ac
• if is a co posit definition nd kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL denotes the set context relation literals assigned
to time-l b l l.
The enviro ment desc iptio E s id o be atisfied in
a h bri history i eve y complex event d fi iti n i B is
satisfie i ha history. We write ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid histories tha satisfy E .
C. Hypotheses
The term hypoth sis in a digital investigation is a conjectur
that may r f , for instanc , to past events in t e lifetime
of digital vices, the tim span during which a system was
perational, y e c abiliti s an nfigurations [?], [?].
In thi pap , we focus on one ty e of hyp thesis rel-
vant to dev loping forensic-ready systems, the nviro -
ent c st uct on hypoth sis. This form f hypothe is os-
tula e about the feasibili y f v nts oc urr n e and pres-
ence of cont xtual cond tions of i t rests. It may be cap-
ured as an v nt’s composi e d fi iti n h / d, w re h
is a omplex event mark g the atisf ction of a hy oth-
sis, and with Ap in d be ng e pty and Ac and KL
cont i ing only c mplex e en s c nt xt r lation lit-
r ls resp ctively. For instanc the hy o esis Illega Copy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {c y(bo ,doc,m1)}, {m un d(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {moun d(usb1,m1), copy(b b,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses are interpreted over finite complex histories.
Their satisfaction is gi n by the d finit on below.
Definition 7 (Hyp t es Sati faction): A ypothesis h (with
d fini ion h / ) is said to be satisfied in a complex hist ry
! at position b, i.e. !, b |= h, if th re exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = c a, ..., ceg, ..., c b that is narration of
d with r spect to 0 2  ( ) an order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |A , g |= kl.
We istingu h betw en supportable and refutable hypothe-
ses in environment E .
D finiti n 8 (Hyp the s Supporta ility nd R futability):
L t ⌥(E) be the set of ybrid istories sati fying E . A
hypothesis (with d finition h / d) s aid o be supportabl
i E if there exists a hybr d history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutabl if ther exists a
hi t ry   2 ⌥(E) su h that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will d not th set of hybrid histories n ⌥(E) supporting
H ⌥+ E) nd th se refuti g it ⌥ (E). Con id r th
potential hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, since t ere is a de-
comp si ion of   that yiel s a nar ati of the d fi iti n of Il-
yes
A his ry may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (resp. complex) history, denoted   (resp. !), if all
the events that appear in it are pri itive (resp. co plex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to denote a complex history where cei is
the set of complex event occurring concurrently at position
i, and similarly for a primitive history  .
An environment descripti n E i in rpr ted over a sequen e
of primitive and complex v nts (we refer t as a hybrid
history  ). Its satisfacti n is det r in d wit resp ct to the
satisfacti n of complex events’ c posite definiti ns i B
according to I.
For the satisfaction of an eve ’s composite definition, we
consider the not on f a ‘narration’ (a to al order over the
partial order given in a c mpl x vent’s d finition). F r a
narration to b construct d, ea compl x ven ap aring in
a efini ion is refined until all complex events are reduced to
their primitive events a d co ext relation literals. The result
of this r fi eme t procedure applied to d finition d is a set of
composite defi itions  (d). Note that c text relatio literals
are ot r fined by their initia i g and te m ating ev ts.1
Give  (d), a narration of a d is captured with respe t to
one of he elements in  (d). W will use the notation  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote th pr j ction f   ver pri itive
(r ps. complex) events in Ap (resp. Ac).
Definiti n 5 (Na rat on of C mp site D finition): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i be behaviour des ri ti n and d = hLd, d
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composi e definition in D. L t (d) be
the set of definitions ob ai ed refining d. A ration f d is
a hybrid history   = he1, ..., hem, f there exists a 0 2  (d)
and a t tal rde l1   ...   ln over Ld0 such hat:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , f li   lj the < b (where 1 
a, b  m ,
•  d0(li)|Ap = (he )|A
•  d0(li)|Ac = ( a)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the set f primitiv vents
and complex events respectively assigned to time-lab l l.
For instance the following are three example narrations for
enter ali e, r01)’s c m osite efiniti n
 1 = {swipe card(alice, fc), cctv acc ss(alice, 01, cctv1 ,
enter(alice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s pe ca d(alic , fc)}1, ,
{cctv acce (alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alic , r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe card(alice, nfc), enter( lice, r01)}2)
C nt x d scriptions’ r lations ar interpr ted v r comp ex
istories. Give k ⌘ hINk, TRk, i tk 2 I, k is tru at p s t on
b in a c mpl x ist ry ! = ce1, ..., ce , ..., cen iff ither the
followi g holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ eINk 2 c a ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < )! eTRk 62 ceg).
otherwise i is s id to be false. We a su e hist ries in whic
terminating n initiating v nts f r a context relation not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorit m ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concurrently. We now define the satisfaction of complex
event definitions histories as follows.
Definition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition e / d 2 B and a hybrid history  ,   is said to satisfy
e / d with r spe to E if for very dec mp ition   = yz,
if y = he , ..., heg, ., heb is a narration of d with respect to
d0 2  (d) and rder l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (heb)|Ac
• if is composite definition and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL th n
 |Ac , g |= kl
wher  (l)|KL den t th set context relati lit als as igned
o ti e-label l.
The envi onm nt description E is said to be atisfied in
a hybrid history if every complex ve t definition i B is
satisfied in that history. We writ ⌥(E) to d n e the se of
hybrid histori s tha s tisfy E .
C. Hypoth ses
The term hypothesis in igital in estigat on is a c njectu
that ma refer, for insta ce to past vents in th li tim
of digital devices, t time span during which a s stem was
perational, system capabilit es an configura i ns [?], [?].
In this paper, we focus n one type of hypothesis r l-
evant o veloping foren ic-r ady systems, the envir -
ment c st ucti n hypothesis. This for of hypothesis po -
tula es bou the feasibilit f ev nts oc urrence and pr s-
enc of con xt al cond tio s of i ter sts. It may be cap-
tu d as an ev t’s compo ite definition / d, wh re h
is a complex ev t marking th atisfacti n of a hyp t -
sis, and with A in d be ng e pty and Ac and KL
cont ning o ly complex events and context relation lit-
rals resp ctively. For inst nce the hypo hesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy(bob,doc,m1)}, {m unted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {m u t d(usb1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}} .
Hypothes s are interpreted over finite complex histo ies.
Their tisfact on is give by the definition bel w.
Defin ion 7 (Hypothese S t sfaction): A h pothesi h (with
defi ition / d) is said to be sati fied a complex history
! at position b, i. . !, b |= h, if there exists a d c mposition
! = xyz such hat y = , ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with r pect to d0 2  (d) an ord r l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |A g |= kl.
We distin u h b tween suppo t ble and r fut bl ypothe-
es in environment E .
Definition 8 (Hyp theses Supporta ility an Refutability):
Let ⌥( ) be t et f hybrid histories satisfying E . A
hypothesis h (with d finition h / d) is said t be supportable
in E if re xists a hybrid hist ry   2 ⌥(E) suc that for
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said o be refuta le if the x ts a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will d not th set of ybrid hist ri s in ⌥(E) su porting
H a ⌥+ E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consid r t e
potential hybrid h story shown i Fig. ??, since t ere is a de-
composition of   that yi l s a nar ation of the d finition of Il-
legalCopy hypothesis such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
hen Ill galCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preservation Specifi ation
Operational pr ervation specifications OS specify the op-
erations that an be erformed by the Controll r component
in terms of domain-specific co ditions, as well as additional
constraints for when operations may and must be executed
to satisfy preservation require ents [?]. The controlled oper-
ations for the controller are a set of preserve(a,ts) operations
wher a indicates the occurrence of a primitive event in the
environment, and ts marks the time-sta p instance (from the
system cl ck) at wh ch th occurrence was observed by the
cont ller. Th m n t re event (and c ndition) are the receipt
of a notificat on of occurrenc ca tured by the receiv (a, ts)
op ration wher a and ts are as befor .
The domai -spe ifi condition c ptures the basic state tra -
sitions d fi ed by the application of an operation in the
domain. I is specified a pair containing a doma n p -
conditi n (DomPre) and a domain ost-c n ition (DomPost),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and preserved(a, ts). R quir d condi-
tions, on the other hand, captur s r gth ned con itions
on the ftware-controll d op r tions that ntribute to th
satisfactio of the require ts. Th y ar express d in the
form of required pre- and trigge - condit s. R quired pre-
c nditions (ReqPr ) are co diti ns th t capture a permission to
erfo m preserve operation. Re uire t igger-condi ions (R -
qTrig) are co iti s t at apture an obligation t perform a
preserve operation. An exa ple of an peration l preservation
requirements for he operations pr serve(sys copy(e,d,m),ts)
(for some employee e, document d and comput r m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys c py( , d,m), ts)) =
{¬prese v d(sys opy(e, d, , ts)}
D mPost( reserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d,m, ts)}
R qPre(pres rve(sys py( , d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy( , d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserv (sys copy( , d, ), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ 3 < s4 < ts^
pres rv ( ys login e, d, ), ts1)^
served(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬pr serv d(sys logout( ,m), s3)}
The above says that th ccurre ce of the ev t sys copy
must be preserved by the Controlle in he storage, if th latter
already contains ntri s about the occurrences of employ e’s
logging to a computer and the ounting of a storag device on
it, and no entries about employee’s logging out from computer
and unmounting of the st rage devic from t c mp t r are
stored.
An operati nal preservatio specification OS efines all ad-
issibl pr servation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of pres rve operations th t may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). W call each sequ nce a potential log
and write it in the form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). The t of pot n ial logs admissible
by OS is denoted as ⇧(OS).
We now define the forensic readiness specification. Note
th t w conside tsi to b an bs ra tion over real-tim clock
variables that may be obtained following techniques such as
[16], [7]. The ge eration of such abstr ctions is ou si e the
scop of the paper. We...
Definition 9 (Preservation Coverage and Completeness):
Given an enviro ment description E and hypothesis H that is
both supportable and refutable in E . Let OS be an operational
preservation specification. Then OS is said to be cover a
potential istory   = (he1, ..., hen) 2 ⌥+(E), if there exists a
po ential log ⇡ = (f 1, ..., fen) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 (hei)|A , preserve(a, ts ) 2 f i (OS cov rs   for hort.) It
is aid to b pr servation complet w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all pot nt al hist ries in ⌥+(E) and not a y hist ry in ⌥ (E).
We say the ny pecificati n that ets the pr servation
completeness d ribed above ac ieves the pr servation e-
quire ent for H E , d oted RH, and by abus of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Ou pp ach for s thesising the pres rvatio specification
(see Figure 3) requir s as input a nviro me t descr pt on
E , and a s t of specula ive ncid nt hy o heses H hat ar
supportable and ref able by E . Suc inputs c n b r vid d,
f r instance, b he softwar ngineer. We assume hat the
s i t on of the nvironment correc and the sp culativ
hypotheses are kn n a-priori, bef re an inves igatio starts.
Pr s rvation specification synthesis is performed in thre
phases.
1) Hi tory Generati . In t is p as , we search for hybrid
histori s ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) with r spect to H. Th exist nc
of h tories in ⌥+(E) nsures that the hypotheses of inter-
est ar feasibl w t in he i t d d enviro ment. If ⌥+(E)
is pty, this means that he it r e ypothesis cannot
occur within the nviro ment desc ibed, a d thus may ot
be a security conc rn, o that the environment description
d/or h specu ativ ypoth ses are incorrec and eed to
be revis d (e.g., by a s curity ad ini trator). The histories
⌥ (E) operates as a proxy f r the synthesis phase to ensure
nly elev nt event occurren es are preserve .
2) S cificatio Verificatio . Given the generated ⌥+(E), we
c ck if the pr mitive history pr jection f r each history is
‘cover d’ by th pres rvatio specifi atio , i. ., t re exis
orresponding potent al o . If this is t e case, then e
current preservati n sp cificatio OS s tisfi s the preservati n
r qu re ts a d t e process terminates. If ome primitive
history projection is not, then new operational preservation
pecifica ion must be synthesised in the n xt phase.
3) Specification Synt esis. The synthesis aims to learn a
new R qPre a d required trig er-conditions ReqTrighat would
prescribe the preservati n f the p tential i tories ⌥+(E)
and ot those in ⌥ (E). The output is a set of requir d pr -
cond tions . The new specifica ion OS0 is given as in ut to t
f rensic-ready ontroller that is respon ible for its enactment
during th syst m operation.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to define
and formalise preservation requirements within a software
ngi eering context and to prop se an au omatic means for
synthesising pecifications th t atisfy t m.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our motivating exam le is a rporate fraud incid t,
inspir d by th Gall on Grou case [19]. We co sider an
nvironme t within an e terp ise building, w ere two empl y-
e s, ali e and ob, w rk (see Fig. 1). bob and alice av
laptops (m2 a d m3, respectiv ly), pr vided by the mpany.
A s nsi ive document doc is stored on the server machine 1
th t is locat d in th ffic r01. Ac ss to r01 is co trolled
by nfc read r nd s monitored by a cctv c er . Bot alice
and bob ar auth ris d to acc s 01 an to login to m1. An
incident of onc rn is rel ted to t exfiltration of h d c.
Acti i i s s h teri g a r m ay b ob erv ( nferr d)
t roug low lev l system e ent that ca b bs rv f o
igi al d vi e , eferred to a evi e c s u c s. Ex mples of
lo l vel ev t n be a log try a ex ern l server to
which cctv is co nected identifying an agent co ing th ough
the o do r, or an fc log en recordi g th read ng of a
car tag.
empl y : aliceemployee: b b laptop: m2 l ptop: m3
deskt p: m1
file: doc
ocatio : r01
r ader: nfc1
cam r : cctv1
storage: ubs1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
S ppose th t a ig tal inv stigati n related to th doc
exfiltratio is i itiated. An investigat r ma suspect that t e
do was co i d onto a st rage device mou ted on m1 and may
formulate a ypothesis n this ba is. However sh is u c rt in
about wh t exact events ust have occurr d for thi hypothe s
to be true. H nc , s e reco stru ts va io sce ar os abou pos-
sible system vents that c uld have ccu red (i.e., histori s).
On possibility is that alice entered r01, performed the log n
t m1, m un e u b1 on m1 a d c pied t e doc. A other
is hat bob ente d the room but u d alice’s crede tial to
login to 1 a d copy the file onto usb1. A m re sop isticat d
alternativ m y be that alic acce ed 01 an mou ted a
storage devic , a d sh subs que tly copi d the doc in the
storage remotely. Each f these po sibiliti s w uld equire he
i vestig r to identify th relevant devic s, s arch through the
records for ea h of hese devi es ( .g., logs fro all r ders,
cctv recor ings and hard driv s f r ll mac ines) and c ck
if they support or ref te her hypothesis.
Given the multit de of histories that could be constructed
within a environment, a sound investigation would be depen-
den a) the inv stiga or ’ ability to reconstruct all possible
hist ries, b) the devices t preserve the required activities
that corr spo d to such histories and c) the inv stigators to
examin all thes g inst the hypotheses. As the volume of
da a to analyse is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a d r ssure to deliver result e r-increasing, the cognitive
ad on investigato s escalates, making w y for evidence and
egative biases to go unn ticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be co cealed by offenders (clearing hard-
riv syst m hist ry) or might not be tai ed by a device (file
copies events), potenti evidence may be l st.
Although p eserving all vents that can be observed from
potential evidence ources in the vironment may seem
lau ibl , xamin tion of l rge data-sets is often expensive
and tim -consuming d may mask w at is truly r levant for
the inve tigation. For example, 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, whil a h rd drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
ve age. In the example, not all file copy even s ar relevant to
supp rt th specul t v hypothe is, but only th se taki g place
w il st rag vi is currently mounted. Ther fore, t re
is a pr ssing d for d velopi g systems that are forensic-
re dy, i. ., that can preserve ‘r levant’ evidenc proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In t s pap r we att mpt t a dr ss two question : 1) Ca
preservation requi m s b f rmulate pr cisely? 2) What
are the s stem sp c ficati ns that could achieve them and can
the e by sy thesised aut matically?
T ar icul e the probl m, we follow Jackson a d Zave [17],
[31] a proach to requir m nts efinitions and satisfaction.
In t eir r qui me ts reference m del [], to guar tee that
a m c e ac eves it eq irements R, it is necessary o
show that it specification S s sfies W, S |= R, where W
captures s me ‘ om in knowledge’ — descriptive ass rtions
about world ph m na that are true regardless of b haviour
of t m chine. In our sett ng W comprise th nvi onment
description E , and the pecula ive inci ent hypothese H. The
‘s ecification’ S r pre ents operat onal ons raints over what
a d whe th ’ achine’, must preserve having speculated
ov r events lyi g in th s are phenomena. In our case, these
pecifi ations s oper tional preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preservation requirem nts are
prop rti s ov r E , and OS i ing OS to pr serve any
v nt belongi g to any history that shows h w E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), wh RH denot s the requirement
pres vations with r s ect to hypotheses H.
Secti IV fo alis s the concepts eeded for defining the
preservati requirement problem preci sly. Section V pro-
p ses n appro ch f r synt esis ng preservation specifications
fr m p cula ed hyp heses and environment descriptions.
For the l tte we assume th design choice of having a
single Controller that int racts with the individual evidence
ources and whose preservation sp cification w synthe ise
(See Fig. 2). T e Co troller rec ives events fro the digital
Hyp theses
 
no
Fi . 3. O r approach for synthesising reservation specifications.
1) H s ory Genera o . I th s pha e, we search for h rid
hi t ies ⌥+(E) a d ⌥ (E) sup rti and r futing H r -
sp ctively. Th exist nce of istor es in ⌥+(E) sures a
the hypoth ses of i ter st ar f asibl w thin t e inten d
env ronm nt. If ⌥+(E) is e ty, his eans h t ithe the
hypothesis cannot cur withi he envir nm t d c ib d,
B = {                                                     }
some b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable if there exists a
history   2 ⌥(E) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and those refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history show in Fig. ??, since there s a de-
composition of   that yields a narr ti n of the defi it f Il-
egalCopy ypothe is suc that  |Ac , 5 |= u ed(usb1, 1),
then Ill galCopy is supportable in E .
D. Operational Preserva on Specificati
Operat onal preservatio sp cifica io s OS p cify th op-
erations that can be perf rmed by the Controll r com ent
in terms of domain-spe ific c di ions, a well s addi io al
con traints for when op ra ons may a d must b x cuted t
satisfy preservati equir me t [46]. Th tr lled o r -
tions for the con roller are a s t of r se ve(a,ts) op ati s
where a i icates th o curr ce f a pri itive ev t i t
environment, and ts marks t ti e-st mp ins ance ( r m e
system clock) at which t occurre ce was bs rved by e
controller. The monitored event ( nd di n) are th r c ip
of a notification of occurrence c pture by th rec ive(a, ts)
operation where a d ts are as befor .
The domai -specific condition captur the b si st te ra -
sitions defined by the applicati n of a ration i th
domain. I is specified as a pair contai i g a d m in pr -
condition (DomP ) and a domain p st- ondit on (DomPo t),
e.g., ¬preserved(a, ts) and pr ser ed( , ts). R quir d c ndi-
ti ns on the the hand, captur trength ned on itions
on the softwa -controlle oper tion tha c t ibut t th
satisfaction of the requirem nts. The re expre s d in t
form of equired pre- and trigg - conditio s. R quire p -
condition (ReqPre) are conditions that capture a mis i to
perform a pres ve operation. Required trigger-c nd tions (R -
qTrig) a conditions that capture an obligation to erform a
preserve op ration. An xample of an operati nal preservation
requirements for the operations preserve(sys c py(e,d,m),t )
(for some employee e, document d and computer m) is
DomPre(preserve(sys copy(e, d, ), ts)) =
{¬pres rved(sys copy(e, d,m, s)}
DomPost(preserve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserve (sys copy( , d,m, ts)}
ReqPre(prese ve(sys copy(e, d,m), t )) =
{received(sys copy(e, d,m), ts),
ReqTrig(preserv (sys copy( , d,m), ts)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 t 3 ts2 ts3 ^ s3 ts4 < ts^
reserve (sys login(e, d,m), ts1)^
ount(s,m), ts2)^
(sys logout(e,m), t 3)}
The above says t t rrence of the event sys copy
must be preserved, if ller already preserved infor-
mation about an e l ’s l ing onto a computer and the
mounting of a storage device on it, but not a subsequent entry
about his/her logging out or un ounting of the storage device.
An operational preservation specification OS defines all ad-
missible preservation capacities (potential logs) as sequences
of preserve operations that may be executed by the con-
troller (and devices). We c ll each s quence a potential log
and write it in t e form (⇡ = {pr se ve( 11 ts1)}1, ...,
{preserve(a1m, tsm)}m). T e set of potential logs admissible
by OS is not d as ⇧(OS).
We ow defi t e forensic r adin ss sp cification. N te
that we consi er tsi to be an abstract on over real-time clock
var ables that ma be obtain d followi g t hn qu s such a
[24], [10] Th generation f such b ract ons is outside the
sco f he .
Definit on 9 (P es rva i Cov age nd Com leteness):
Gi an nv ronment de riptio E and a hypothesis H h t is
both suppo tabl a d refut ble in E . L t OS be an opera ional
res rvat n sp cific tio . Th OS s s d to b cover a
t ntial hi tory   = (he1, ..., he ) 2 ⌥+(E), f the e exi ts a
po n ial og ⇡ = (fe1, ..., f ) 2 ⇧(OS) uch th t for very
2 (hei |Ap , pr serv (a tsi) 2 f i (OS co er f r sho t.) I
s s i b pr s rv tio compl te w. .t. E and H i it cove s
ll p t tial hi ories in ⌥+(E) and n any h story in ⌥ (E).
We ay th any pecific ti h t me ts the pr serv ti n
pl t nes d rib ab ve achi ves the pr servation re-
quirement or H in E , d n t RH, d by abu of tation
d o e th s as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
E , H, ⌥+(E), ⇧+(OS), ⇧ (OS)
Our ap ro c for synthe is ng t pr servation s cification
(s F g. 3) tak s s inpu an envir men de cri tion E , a d a
set f pecula ive cid t h p th s s H, lic ted, f r instance,
by a d in xpert (softw re eng r or sec rity administ a-
t r). W as ume that the scri tion of the nviron ent is
corr ct n th spec lativ pot e es of c nc rn are known
a sign-tim . The appr ach comp i e th e pha .
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Sp cification
Synthes
2 3
Environment
ε
A h story ay occur at various levels [?]. It i called a
primitiv (resp. c mplex) h tory, den ted   (r sp. !), if all
th v nts th t appear i it are pr mitive (resp. complex).We
write ! = ce1, ...cen to denote a c mplex history where cei is
t s t of complex ve ts occurring concurrently at position
i, and si il rly for a p imi iv history  .
n e vir nment de cripti n E is interpret d ver s qu nce
of pri it ve and c mpl x events (we fe to as a hybr d
history  ). Its satisfaction is determined with respect to the
satisfaction of complex events’ composite defi itions in B
c rd g o I.
For th satisfacti n of an event’s composite efi ition, we
consider the notion of a ‘narr tion’ (a total order over the
partial order given in a complex event’s definition). For a
narration to be constructed, ach co plex ev nt appearing in
a definition is r fined until all complex vents are re uced to
their primitive ev nts and co text relation li ra . The resu
of this refinem nt pr cedure applied to definition is a set of
com osi e d finit o s  (d . Note that c text relation literals
are not refi ed by th ir initiating an termi ating events.1
Given  (d), a arration f a d is capture with r spect to
o e of th ele e ts i  (d). We will use the notation  |A
(reps. |Ac ) to d n te the projectio of   over rim tive
(reps. c mpl x) eve ts in Ap (res . Ac).
Definitio 5 (N rration of Composite Definiti n): Let B=
hAp,Ac,K, , /i b a be aviour descriptio and d hLd, 
, d, A
p
d, A
c
d,KLdi a composite definition in D. L t  (d) be
he s t of definiti ns obtained r fining d. A narration f d is
a h brid histor   = he1, ..., hem, if ther exis s a d0 2  (d)
and a total order l1   ...   ln over Ld0 uc that:
• for al li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj then < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|A = (hea)|Ac .
wher  (l)|Ap nd  (l)|Ac d ot the set of primitive ev
and complex events respectively assigned to time-l bel l.
For nstance the f llowing are th ee exa ple narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite efi ition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), t access(alice, r01, cctv1),
enter(a ice, r01)}1)
 2 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv cess(alice, r01, cctv1), enter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({ ct a cess(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe ard(alice, nf ), enter(alice r01)}2)
Context descript ons’ rel ti s re inter reted over c mpl x
his ories. Giv k ⌘ hINk, TRk, initki 2 I, k s true at p sition
b in a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., cen iff either the
followi g holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eIN cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
therwise it is said to be false. We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a context relation do not
1See github an outline of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
occur concur ently. We now defin the satisf cti of compl x
event definitions histories as f llows.
D finition 6 (Complex Event Definition Satisfaction): Given
an environment description E=(B,C,I), a complex event def-
inition / d 2 B and a hybrid his ory  ,   is said to satisfy
e / with resp ct to E if f r every decompo it   = xyz,
if y = hea, ... h g ..., heb a narration of d with sp ct to
d0 2  (d) and ord r l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• 2 (h b)|Ac
• if d is a composite d finitio and kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL t en
 |Ac , g |= kl
where  (l)|KL de o the set context relation literals assigned
t tim -lab l l.
The e vir ment descripti E is said o be satisfi d in
a ybrid history if very compl x event defini ion in B is
sati fied in that histor . We writ ⌥(E) to denote the set of
hybrid hi tories that satisfy E .
C. Hypoth s s
The term hypothesis in a d gital investigation is a conje ture
that may refer, for i stance, to past events in the lifetime
of digi al devices, the ime span dur g which a system was
o erational, syst apabilities and configurati s [?], [?].
In this pape , we focus o ne type of hypothesis rel-
van to de loping forensic-rea y systems, the environ-
ment co struction hypothesis. T i form of hypoth sis pos-
tulat s about t feasibili y of ven s occurrence and pres-
nce of co textual conditio s of in eres s. It may b cap-
tured as a vent’s composit definitio h / d, where h
is a c mplex event m rkin he sat sfaction f a poth-
es s, and i Ap in d b ing e pty a d Ac and KL
containing only co pl x vents and o text relation lit-
erals respectiv l . Fo instance the hypoth sis Illeg lCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy( ob,doc,m1)}, {m unted( sb1,m1)},
{ 1 ! {m unt d(us 1,m1), copy(bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypotheses ar interpre ed over finite co plex histories.
Th ir satisfact on is given by th definition below.
Definiti 7 (Hyp theses S tisfaction): A hypothesis h (with
d finition h / d) i said o be satisfied in a complex hi tory
! t posit o b, .e., !, b |= h, if th r exists dec mposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., c g, ..., ceb that is a narration f
d with respect to d0 2  (d) and order 01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then  |Ac , g |= kl.
We distinguish between supportable a d refutable hypothe-
ses i enviro me t E .
Defi ition 8 (Hypotheses Su p rtability and Refutability):
Let ⌥(E) be the se of yb id hist ries satisfying E . A
hypoth is h (with d finition / d) i aid to b supportabl
in E if th re exi ts a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such t at fo
some b,  |Ac , b |= . It is aid to be refutable if there exists a
hist ry   2 ⌥(E) su h h t fo all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denot the se f hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) and h se refuting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potential hybrid history shown i Fig. ??, since th re is a de-
co position of   that yields a narration of the d finition of Il-
y s
A history may occur at various levels [?]. It is called a
primitive (r sp. compl x) history d noted   (r sp. ! if ll
the ev t th t p ar i it a primitive (resp. compl x).We
writ ! = c 1, ... e to e te complex hi tory wh re c i is
the set of complex ev nt occurring concurr tly at positi n
i, nd imila ly a primitiv histo y  .
An env r m t d cri t E is int rpr ted over a s q enc
f rimitive and com l x ev nts (w r f r to as hybri
history  ). Its satisf cti is det rmined wit respe t to th
satisfa tion f co plex ev ts’ comp site d fini ions i B
according to I.
For the s tisfact on of an vent’s compo i e defin tion, w
consider the n t of a ‘narration’ (a total ord r o er the
p rtial r er give in a complex event’s defi ion). For a
a r tion to b cons u t d, ea h c mplex e nt app aring
a defin is r fi ed un il all complex v n s a r uced to
their rimitiv event an cont x rel tion l t rals. The sult
of this refinemen proce ure applied to defi itio d is a set f
osite d finitions  (d). Note ha cont xt r lation lit rals
are ot refined by their initi ting and t minating ev ts.1
Given  ( ), a narr tion of a is captured with respe t to
one of the elements  (d). We will us the notat on  |Ap
(reps.  |Ac ) to denote the projection f   over pri itive
(rep . om l x) events n Ap (resp. Ac).
D finiti n 5 (N rration of Composite Definition): L t B=
hAp,Ac,K,D, /i b a behaviour de cri tion an d = hLd, d
,  , Apd, A
c
d,KL i a ompos d finition in D. et  ( be
the set of d finiti s obtained r fining d. A narratio of d is
a ybri hist ry   = h 1, ..., he , if there exists a d0 2  ( )
nd a total rder l1   ...   ln ov Ld0 such hat:
• for all li, lj 2 Ld0 , if li   lj the a < b (where 1 
a, b  m),
•  d0(li)|Ap = (hea)|Ap
•  d0(li)|Ac = (hea)|Ac .
where  (l)|Ap and  (l)|Ac denote the s t of primitiv events
and compl x e nts respectively ssigned to time-l bel l.
For insta ce the following are three example narrations for
enter(alice, r01)’s composite definition
 1 = ({swipe card(alice, nfc), cctv access( li e, r01, cctv1),
nter(ali e, r01)}1)
 2 = ({s pe ca d(alice, nfc)}1, ,
{cctv acc ss(alic , r01, cctv1), nter(alice, r01)}2)
 3 = ({cctv access(alice, r01, cctv1)}1,
{swipe c rd(alice, nfc), enter(alic , r01)}2)
C ntext escriptions’ relations re interpreted over complex
hi tories. Giv n k ⌘ hINk, TRk, in tki 2 I, k is true at position
b i a complex history ! = ce1, ..., ceb, ..., c iff eithe the
following holds:
• initk ^ 8a 2 N , eTRk 2 TRk.(0 < a < b)! eTRk 62 cea;
• 9a 2 N . (a < b) ^ (eIN cea ^ 8g 2 N , eTRk 2
TRk.((a < g < b)! eTRk 62 ceg).
t erwise it is said to be fals . We assume histories in which
terminating and initiating events for a c ntext relation do not
1See github an outl ne of a refinement algorithm ?? for obtaining  (d).
ccur co curr ntly. We now define the satisfactio of compl x
event efinitions his orie as f l ows.
Defin tion 6 (C mplex Event Definiti n Satisfa tion): Given
an enviro ment d scripti n E=(B,C,I), a c mplex event def-
in tion e / d 2 B and a hyb id histo y  ,   is said to satisfy
/ d with res e t t E if for every dec osition   = xyz,
if y = hea, ..., heg, ..., heb is n rrati n o d with respect to
d0 2  (d) a d ord r l01 ...   l0j   ...   l0n then:
• e 2 (h b)|Ac
• i is composit d finition nd kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL then
 |Ac , g |= kl
wh re  (l)|KL deno es the set context lation literals assig ed
to time-label l.
The envir nment descripti E is said to b a isfi d in
a hyb id hi tory if every complex vent definitio in B is
sati fie in hat history. We write (E) t de t th set of
hybr d histories that s sfy E .
C. Hypothe es
The te m hy othesis i a gital inv stigation is a conjectur
that may re er, for in tance, to as vents in e l fetime
of igital dev c s, the time an during which a system was
operati nal, syst m apabilit and configurations [?], [?].
In th s p r, w focus o one type of hypothesis rel-
van to d ve oping forensic-ready yst ms, the environ-
ment constructi hypoth sis. This orm of hypothesis pos-
tulates ab ut th f a bility of ev nt ccurrence and pres-
enc of contextu l conditi ns f interests. It may be cap-
tur d as n event’s c mposite definition h / d, where h
i a mpl x event marking the satisf ction of a hypoth-
esis, and with Ap in d being p y nd Ac and KL
containing o ly complex events and ontext r lation lit-
erals respectively. For insta ce the hypothesis IllegalCopy
/ h{l1}, ;, ;, {copy( ob,d c,m1)}, {mounted(usb1,m1)},
{l1 ! {mou ted(u b1,m1), cop (bob,doc,m1)}}i.
Hypothes s ar i erpreted ov r finite c mplex histories.
Th i s ti faction is give by the definitio b l w.
Definition 7 (Hy otheses Satisfa tion): A hypo hesis h (w th
definition h / d) is said o b a isfied in a complex history
! at position b, i.e., !, b |= h, if there exists a decomposition
! = xyz such that y = cea, ..., ceg, ..., ceb that is a narration of
d with respect to 0 2  (d) and order l01   ...   l0j   ...   l0n
and if kl 2  d0(l0j)|KL th n  |Ac , g |= kl.
We dis ngu betwee supportable and r futable hypothe-
ses i environm nt E .
Defi iti 8 (Hypotheses Supportability and Refutability):
Le ⌥(E) be et of rid histori s sat sf ing E . A
hypoth sis (w th defin ti n h / d) i said to be supportable
in E if there exists a hybrid history   2 ⌥(E) such that for
s m b,  |Ac , b |= h. It is said to be refutable f there exists
history   2 ⌥( ) such that for all b,  |Ac , b 6|= h.
We will denote the set of hybrid histories in ⌥(E) supporting
H as ⌥+(E) an t ose ref ting it ⌥ (E). Consider the
potenti l hybrid history shown in Fig. ??, s nce there is a de-
composition f   that yields a narrati of the definition of Il-
legalCopy hyp the i such that  |Ac , 5 |= mounted(usb1,m1),
then IllegalCopy is supportabl in E .
D. r ti l P servation Specifi ation
Op rational pre e vation specifications OS specif th op-
erati ns that can b p rformed by the Controll r compo ent
in terms of domai -spe ific co diti ns, a well dditional
constr ints for when o ratio s may an ust be execu ed
to sat sfy r s rvati n r quire ents [?]. The ontroll d oper-
ations for he controll r are a set of p s rve(a,ts) o rations
whe i dic tes th curr c f primi ive event in th
environm nt, an t m rks th time-sta p i stanc (from the
yst clock) at wh ch the o curre ce was bs rved by th
co t ller. Th mon ored ev t (and con ition) re the re ipt
f a tifi ion of rr captured by th receive a, ts)
operation where a and ts are as b fore.
The domain-spe ifi c nditi n c ptu th ba ic state t a -
siti d fi ed by the application of a op rati n in t
d ma n. It is specified as a pai ontaining a domain p -
condition (DomPre) nd a do ain post-co d tion (DomP t),
e.g., ¬p eserv d(a, ts) an pr s rved( , ts). Requir d c n i-
t ons, on he o e hand, c ptur stre gthen c ndi ions
on software-controll opera ions that contribut t the
satisfaction of the r quire e ts. T ey ar expr sed n t e
fo m of equire pre- and trigg r- condit s. R quired pre-
conditi s (ReqP r condi io s th t cap u a perm ssion to
p rf r p serv p ration. R q i ed t igg -conditi ns (R -
Trig) ar conditions that capture an bligation to erform a
prese ve oper t . A ex mple of an operat o l p rva i
r quire e ts for h pera ions pr serve(sys copy( ,d,m),ts)
( or om employe document d and computer m) is
D mPre(pr s rve(sys c py(e, d,m), t )) =
{¬pr serv d(s s c py(e, d,m, ts)}
DomPost(pr se ve(sys copy(e, d,m), ts)) =
{preserved(sys copy(e, d, , ts }
eqPr (pr serve( ys py(e, d,m), ts)) =
{received(sys copy(e, ,m), ts),
R qTri reserv (sy copy( d,m), s)) =
{9ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4 2 Clock, s 2 Str.
ts1 < ts3 ^ ts2 < ts3 ^ ts3 < t 4 < t ^
preserved( ys login(e, d,m), s1)^
preserved(sys mount(s,m), ts2)^
¬preserved(sys logout(e,m), ts3)}
The ab ve says that th ccurrence t e event sys copy
must be pres rve y t e Cont le in torage, if the latter
already cont i en ri s b ut th oc rr c s o mpl yee’s
ogging to computer nd he m unting of a storage d vice on
it, a d no entries b u mployee’s logging out from om ute
and unmounting of th storage d vice from he co puter a e
stored.
An p rati nal preservation sp cification OS d fines all ad-
missibl p eservation capacitie (potential lo s) as seq ence
of preserve operations that may be executed by t e con-
troll r (an ev c s). We cal ach equ nce a potential log
a d w i e it in th form (⇡ = {preserve(a11, ts1)}1, ...,
{preserv (a1m, tsm)}m). The set of potential log admissibl
by OS is denoted a ⇧(OS).
We n w defi e th fo en ic eadiness spec ficati n. Note
th t we consi er tsi to be an bs raction over real-tim clock
variables that may be btained following techniqu s such as
[16], [7]. The gen ration of such abst ctions is utside the
scop of the aper. We...
Definitio 9 (Pres rvation C verage and Co pleten ss):
Giv n n viro nt scripti E and a hyp thesi H that is
both suppo t bl and r futable in E . L OS be an perational
pr servatio sp cificati . Then OS is aid to be cov r a
pote l history   = (he1, ..., h n) 2 ⌥+(E), if th re xists a
potential l g ⇡ = (f 1, ..., fe ) 2 ⇧(OS), such that for every
a 2 ( e )|Ap , preserve( , tsi) 2 fei (OS cover   fo short.) It
is id to e p serv tio omplet w.r.t. E and H if it covers
all potentia histories in ⌥+(E) and not any hist y in ⌥ (E).
W ay the any specification that meets the pr s rvation
completen s d s rib d abov achieve h pre erva ion re-
quirem nt for H i E , de t d RH, and b abuse of notation
denote this as E ,H,OS |= RH.
V. PRESERVATION SPECIFICATION SYNTHESIS
Our app ac f r synth s sing the r va ion specification
(s e Figur 3) requires a i ut a nvironment de criptio
E , and a se of sp cula iv incident hy o hes s H that are
supp rtable and r fu ble b E . Such inp ts can be provided,
for ins a ce, b he software engi e r. W a su that th
escripti of t e nv ronment is cor ct nd th p culative
po ses e k o n a-p i ri, befor an investiga ion s arts.
Pre ervation p cifi i n ynt e is is pe formed in three
ha es.
1) History G nera i . In thi p ase, we search for hybrid
his ories ⌥+(E) a ⌥ (E) with resp ct to H. The existence
f h tories in ⌥+(E) ensures hat the ypotheses of inter-
est are fe sible w thin the i t d d environment. If ⌥+(E)
is empt , th s mea that he it the ypothes s cannot
occu w thi th ironment described, and thus may not
be a s c rity concern, o that the nvir nme t description
an /or the speculative hypothese are i c rrect and need to
be r vi d ( .g., by a security administrator). Th hist r es
⌥ (E) op rates as a proxy for the synthesis phase to ensure
nly relevant v nt occurren es ar preserv d.
2) S ecification Ve ification. G ven the generated ⌥+(E), w
check if the primitiv ist ry pr jection for ach h story is
‘cover d’ by the pres rvation specification, .e., there exists
correspondi g pot tia log. If this is t c se, then the
c rrent preserv i n sp cificatio OS sa isfie the prese vation
requirem nts an he process t rminates. If s me p imitive
hi projecti n is not, then new perati nal reservation
sp cification must be synthesised in the next phase.
3) Sp cification Synthe is. The synthesis aims to learn a
n w ReqPre an requi d trigg r-condit ons R qTrighat would
prescribe t preservati n of t e potential histories ⌥+(E)
and not those in ⌥ (E). The out ut is a set of requir d r -
conditions . Th new specificatio O 0 is given as input to the
forensic-re y controlle that is resp si l for its enactment
du ng h system operation.
To th be t of ou k owledge, th s paper is the first t d fine
a d f mal se preservati n requir me ts within a so tw r
engineer cont xt and o ro ose an au omatic means for
synthesi ing pecifications that atisfy t .
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Our tivating exam le is a corporate frau incid ,
i pir d by th G ll on Grou case [19]. W co sider a
environ ent within an e t rp ise building, where two empl y-
s, ali nd bob, w k (s e Fig. 1). b b a d alice h v
laptops ( 2 m3, respe tively), rovi ed by th o p ny.
A ns ive ocument doc is s or d on the s rver mach e m1
that is oca ed n the ffice r01. A ss to r01 is controlled
by a nf read r and is monit d by cctv cam a. B t alice
and bob r uthoris d to acc ss 01 and to login t 1. An
incid nt of c ncer is related to t e exfiltration of the doc.
Activ t es such ent ri g a room m y be bserv d (inferred)
through l w lev l sy t m vent that can b obs rv d fr m
digi al d v , r f rr to a eviden e s urc s. Ex mpl s of
l w level ev nt can be a log entry on an external s rver to
which cctv is c nected iden ifying a g nt o ing ough
the roo door or an nfc log entry rec ding the readi g of
card tag.
employe : aliceemployee: bob laptop: m2 lapt p: m3
desktop: m1
file: doc
location: r01
reader: fc1
cam r : cctv1
storage: ub 1 
Fig. 1. Setting of our motivating example.
S ppose t at a ig tal i vestigation r lat d to th doc
exfil ratio is initiated. A investigat r may suspect tha the
do was copied onto a s orage d ice mounted on 1 a d may
formulate a hypo h sis on this ba i . Howev r she s uncertai
about what exact vents must have o curr d for th hypothesis
be true. H nc , e rec nstructs vari us sc n ri s ab ut pos-
ibl sy tem vent that ld have occur d (i.e., histo ies).
One p ssibility is that alic entered r01, perfor ed the l gin
t m1, mou ted usb1 on m1 and copi the doc. Another
i that bob ntered the room but u d alic ’s credentials to
login to m1 a d cop the file onto usb1. A more sophisticated
alt rnative may be that alice accesse r01 and mounted a
storag device, and she subsequently copied the doc in the
storage remotely. Each of these possibilities would require the
investigat r to identify th relevant devices, search t rough the
records for each of th se d vices (e. ., log from all readers,
cctv recordings, and ha d drives for all machines) and check
if they supp t or r fute er hypothesis.
Giv the ultitude of histories that could be co structed
withi an e ironment, sound investigation would e depen-
den a) the inv tigato s’ abili y to reconstruct all possible
hi t ries, b) the dev ces to preserve the required activities
that corresp nd to such ist ri s and c) the investigators to
exami e all these agai st the hypotheses. As the volume of
d ta analy e is high, the context of incident unfamiliar,
a pr ssure to deliver results ever-increasing, the cognitive
load on in estigato s escalates, making way for evidence and
egativ biases to go unnoticed [?]. Furthermore, as events
from devices could be conce led by offe ders (clearing hard-
drive ystem hi t ry) or might not be retained by a device (file
copi events), p tential evidence may b lost.
Although preserving all v nts that c n be observed from
poten ial evidenc sources in the environment may seem
plausibl , xamination of large data-set is often expensive
tim - onsuming a d may mask what is truly relevant for
the in stigation. For exampl , 60 days cctv footages would
occupy ⇠10 TB, while a hard drive occupies ⇠500 GB on
average. In th example, not all file copy events are relevant to
support the speculative hypothesis, but only those taking place
wh l a st rage d vi e is curren ly mou ted. Ther fore, there
is a pr ssing e d for developing systems that are forensic-
ready, i.e., that can preserve ‘releva t’ evidence proactively.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper we attempt to address two questions: 1) Can
pre ervati requi ements b formulated precisely? 2) What
ar the syst m specifications that could chieve them and can
these by sy th sised automatically?
To articulate the problem, we follow Jackson and Zave [17],
[31] appro ch to requirements defi itions and satisfaction.
In their requir ments refere ce model [], to guarantee that
machine ac i v s its requireme ts R, it is necessary to
show that it specification S satisfies W, S |= R, where W
c pture some ‘domain knowledge’ — descriptive assertions
about world ph omena that are true regardless f behaviour
of the machine. In our setting W comprises the environment
description E , and the sp culative inci ent hypotheses H. The
‘specifica ion’ S represents operational constraints over what
and when the ’machin ’, must preserve having sp culated
over events lying i the shared phenomena. In our case, these
pecifications as operational preservation specifications, OS.
With this frame of mind, the preserva ion requirements are
p op rties ove E , H and OS r quiring OS to preserve any
vent belonging to any history that shows how E may satisfy
H(i.e., E , H,OS |= RH), where RH denotes the requirement
reservations with respect to hypotheses H.
Section IV formalises the concepts needed for defining the
preservat o requirement problem preciesly. Section V pro-
poses an approach for synthesising preservation specifications
from speculated hypotheses and environment descriptions.
For the latter we assum the design choice of having a
single Con roller th t interac s with the individual evidence
ources and whose preservation specification we synthesise
(See Fig. 2). The Controller r c ives events from the digital
Hyp these
 
no
Fig. 3. Our approach for synthesising preservation specifications.
1) Hist ry Generatio . In this phas , we search fo hybrid
histories ⌥+(E) and ⌥ (E) supporti g and refuting H re-
spectively. The existence of histories in ⌥+(E) ensures that
the hypotheses of interest are feasible within the intended
environment. If ⌥+(E) is empty, this means that either the
hypothesis cannot occur within the environment described,
Fig. 3. Our approach f r sy th s ing pr s a i n p cifi s.
1) Hi t ry Ge era n. I thi , w sear for id
histo i ⌥+(E) nd ⌥ (E) su t g d r ut g H -
spectively. The exist ce of h st ri s ⌥+(E) nsu th
the ypotheses of i ter st ar f asib wit i t i t
e vir nm nt. If ⌥+(E) i mpty an t a it r h
hypothesis cann t occur withi t e nvir n e t d cr be ,
and thus t will n t r quir d o b c sid r d u i g d gital
inv stigation, or that he n iron nt d scr pti n n / r t
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3) Speci￿cation Synthesis.￿e synthesis phase considers E,H ,
PS, { +i } and {  j }. From this it learns a new set of required pre-
and trigger-conditions that would prescribe the preservation of all
potential logs { +i } but not in {  j }, are learned and added to PS.
￿e new speci￿cat on PS0 is given as provided to th controller that
is res nsible for its enactment.
Note the steps above suppose a design-time synthesis approach,
rather than a run-time one.￿e la￿er is constitutes future work.
6 TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
As a proof of concept, we have implemented a prototype tool for
synthesising forensic-ready preservation speci￿cations. Our s lu-
tion uses a (i) declarative language based on the Event Calculus
logic prog am2 [21] to repres and reason about the environment
descriptions, speculative hypotheses, pres rvation speci￿cations
and potential histories and logs in a uniform way, (ii) a Boolea
constraint solver for logic programs, called clingo [], to compute
potential histories and logs that satisfy or refute hypotheses, and
(iii) and a logic-based learner, all d XHAIL [], to synthesise preser-
vation speci￿cati s from examples f pote tial logs.￿e encoding
of the input as well as the execution of the three phases in Section
5 are done automatically.￿e user is expected to provide the initial
input, and the maximum length of the potential histories to be
consi ered in the approach.
In brief, the history generation phase ￿rst tries to ￿n two sets
of models, called answer sets of the program, denoted ANS+ (LE [
LH )n and ANS  (LE [ LH )n , wh re each element in the ￿rst c -
prises a history L + ⇢ ANS+ (LE [LH )n of E of length n m nimally
support ve of a ypothesis i H and each of the second con ains
a hist ry L   ⇢ ANS  (LE [ LH )n that refutes a hypothesis
H . ￿is is done through by solving a constraint that requi s a
hypothesis Lh 2 LH to be satis￿ed by at least one pote tial history
consist nt with LE . ￿e solver searches for the opti al solution
which equates to th minimally supportive or refutive history of h.
We denote the set of minimally supportive hypotheses as L + (E)
and the minimally refutive as L   (E) .
￿e speci￿cation veri￿cation phase hen considers the comput d
histories L + (E) , L   (E) , program LE [ LH and program LPS.￿
phase performs several calls to the solver to check for coverage a d
non-cove a e of ach history L + (E) and L   (E) respectively by
the controller speci￿cation LPS (phase 2). If this is not the case the
potential logs { +i } and {  j } that correspond to L + (E) [ L   (E)
respectively and LE [ LH are given to a logic-based learner [] to
compute pre- and trigger-conditions to ensure the preservation o
these.
To conduct the analysis, our implementation translates the in ut
model into an Event Calculus (EC) logic program [21], a formali
—-. (However, the same technique is implementable in any lang age
supporting some form of behavioural modelling and declarative
synthesis of temporal speci￿cations.) It has been successfully d -
ployed in the context of specifying requirements operationalisation
[3, 4] and asoning about evidence in digital investigations [40].
It runs an o￿-the- shelf model generation tool, clasp Gebser:2011,
to compute histories. Our use of ASP as the underlying veri￿cati
2An logic program is a collection of rules of the form lk  
lk+1, ..., ln, not ln+1, ..., not lm
engine is motivated by its capacity to handle di￿cult (NP-hard)
search problems for EC programs.￿e analysis in clasp is bounded
u to a u er-speci￿ed scop on the size of the domains which corre-
sponds to the number of entities, events and the maximum length
of histories that will be generated. Details of the encoding are
available on h￿ps://github.com/lpasquale/minorityReport.
7 EVALUATION
Our evaluation aims to assess whether t e quality of the synthe-
sised preservation speci￿cation, particularly whether it prescribes
to preserve i) elevant events and ii) the minimum amount of events
nec ssary to support speculativ hypotheses of potential incidents.
To a hieve this aim we developed a prototype tool (implemented in
Python) and used two incident scena io ata-set that are available
publicly for research and training purpo e . Eac data-set ncl des
the data that an investigator would have to examine to explain -
if possible - how the associated inciden scenario o curred. ￿e
to l an case study application are available online3. F r each
sc nario, w m nually m delled the environ ent and the specula-
tive ypoth ses in EC. Not that each log entry an event type i
the data-set is mapped to a primitive event modelled in the envi-
ronm t. Fro this, we us our tool to auto atically ynth sise
preservation speci￿cations.
{ i+}, { j }
To assess whethe th synth sis d eci￿catio prescribes to pre-
s rve relevant events, v ri￿ed w e h r the pr itive events that
the speci￿cati n p escr es o r serv ar relev t o suppor some
of the p ul tiv i cid hypot s s. N th alt ough s m of
e pri i iv v nt may c rres ond to l ries/ v nts in t e
d - et, h s might ot v i bl b c us t h v t b e
r tain d by h ig s u c T s ss wh her h y th sis d
sp ￿c n pr b s p rv t i m m m u of v nts,
we as r d wh r t s i￿ at w ul r scr b e pr s r-
v tio o w g s/ ts pa to h s lud d i
th dat -s t. W l o m su a t l r / v nt
from th d t -s t, w ich i￿ a i pr c b t pres r e,
w el va o su p i f of lativ y-
p theses. At h f t w i us v lidity of
our a roach.
7.1 R l Mi m ity
￿e ￿ st i c t sc ario o si r d s i a u iv r y, w re
student and ac m st ￿ a se a l by u i g univer ity
nd st dents’ r int r l n w k.￿ a a- 4 i clud s he
TCP pack ts fr m th r t s l c i i e t stud nts’
resid nce.￿ fo w si r d t u s s t d ital o rces
wi hi th nvir m n an p d pr iv v pr sent
p ci￿c t ork tra￿c t at ay er lat o ma ls xc ang s.
We modelled the f llowi g pr itiv e s: IMAP/POP work
t a￿c (SUE) relat d t i s s nt fro xt rnal address s t a
academic (SUE); incoming HTTP t ￿ adopt d et-up a cooki
3h￿ps://github.com/lpasquale/minorityReport
4h￿p://digit lcorpora.org/corpora/scenarios/nitroba-university-harassment-scenario
B = {          PS,                    }
Figure 3: Specificati n ge a .
and/or the speculative ypothe a
revision. T e histories Υ−(ℰ) op at s x f
synthesis p ase to ensur only r l an eve t
reserved.
2) Specification Verification. Giv n the g a Υ+(ℰ),
we check if each history is pot ntially cov red by h pre rv -
tion specification, i.e., there exists a corresp ndi g p t ti l
log i Π(PS). If some history in Υ+(ℰ) is t, hen his may
be owing to one of two cases: (i) the FR co tro ler a d th
digital devices do not have the capabilities needed to, respec-
tively, preserve the potential logs and monitor the relevant
events; or (ii) they do but require an operational preservation
specification to be synthesised to ensure their preservation.
In the case of the former, the approach terminates, indicating
a need for additional capabilities. In the latter case, corre-
sponding potential logs {𝜋+𝑖 } and {𝜋−𝑗 } are produced and
passed onto the third phase.
3) Specification Synthesis. The synthesis phase considers
ℰ , ℋ, PS, {𝜋+𝑖 } and {𝜋−𝑗 }. It searches, within a space of
candidate expressions restricted to safety LTL expressions, a
new set of required pre- and trigger-conditions that would
prescribe the preservation of all potential logs {𝜋+𝑖 } but not
in {𝜋−𝑗 }. These are added to PS. The new specification PS′
is given as provided to the FR controller that is responsible
for its enactment. Note the steps above are conducted for a
set of given hypotheses. If new ones are provided, then a new
specification must be generated.
6 TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
As a proof of concept, we have implemented a prototype
tool3 for synthesising forensic-ready preservation specifica-
tions. Our solution uses a (i) declarative language based on
the Event Calculus (EC) logic program [31] to represent and
reason about the environment descriptions, speculative hy-
potheses, preservation specifications and potential histories
and logs in a uniform way, (ii) an off-the-shelf Boolean con-
straint solver for logic programs, called clingo [20], to compute
potential histories and logs that satisfy or refute hypotheses,
and (iii) and a logic-based learner, called XHAIL [41], to
synthesise preservation specifications that cover all histories
supportive of a hypothesis. Our choice of EC logic program as
a language is due to its successful deployment in the context
3The source code of the tool is publicly available at https://github.
com/lpasquale/kEEPER/tree/keeper CLI.
of r quirements operationalisation [4, 5] and reasoning about
ide ce in digital investigations [56]. The encoding of the
i p t as well as the execution of the three phases in Section
5 re d ne automatically. The user is expected to provide the
l input, and the maximum length of the potential histo-
b nsidered in the approach. Our use of the solver
u rlying history generation and specification verifi-
i gi is motivated by its capacity to handle difficult
( P- r ) s arch problems for EC programs. For encoding
f pr s rva i n specifications, we follow the translation in [5].
D a f h encoding for the environment description and
re available at https://github.com/lpasquale/
k EPER/tr e/keeper CLI/RunningExample. Although the
o c i demonstrated for a particular language, the prin-
ci l s b nd it could be applied to other formalisms and
lv .
I b i f, t e history generation phase first tries to find
s f models of the program 𝐿ℰ ∪𝐿ℋ. Each element in
th first set is a model of 𝐿ℰ ∪ 𝐿ℋ that comprises a history
𝐿𝜐+ of maximum length 𝑛 that is minimally supportive of a
ypothesis in ℋ. Each element in the second set contains a
history 𝐿𝜐− of length 𝑛 that refutes all hypotheses in ℋ. This
is done by solving a constraint that requires a hypothesis
𝐿ℎ ∈ 𝐿ℋ to be satisfied by at least one potential history
consistent with 𝐿ℰ ∪ 𝐿ℎ. The solver searches for the optimal
solution being defined as the fewest event occurrence in a
history which equates to the minimally supportive history
of ℎ. We denote the set of minimally supportive histories as
𝐿ϒ+(ℰ) and the minimally refuting histories as 𝐿ϒ−(ℰ).
The specification verification phase considers the histories
𝐿ϒ+(ℰ) and 𝐿ϒ−(ℰ), program 𝐿ℰ ∪ 𝐿ℋ and program 𝐿PS.
This phase performs several calls to the solver to check for
consistency of each history 𝐿ϒ+(ℰ) and 𝐿ϒ−(ℰ) respectively
with the specification 𝐿PS (phase 2). The solver searches for
models that satisfy the program 𝐿ℰ ∪ 𝐿ℋ ∪ 𝐿PS ∪ 𝐿𝜐 (for
each 𝐿𝜐 ∈ 𝐿ϒ+(ℰ) ∪𝐿ϒ−(ℰ)) and a constraint requiring there
to be an isomorphic potential log 𝐿
𝜋+𝑖
in the model. If a
potential log for a supportive history cannot be found, then
the program is unsatisfiable. In this case the approach outputs
those potential histories to the user for further consideration
(e.g., amending the FR controller’s capabilities).
Otherwise all computed potential logs 𝐿Π+(PS) and 𝐿Π−(PS)
that correspond to histories in 𝐿ϒ+(ℰ) ∪ 𝐿ϒ−(ℰ) respectively
and the program 𝐿ℰ ∪𝐿PS are passed to a logic-based learner.
The aim of the learner is to search through a candidate space
(given by a language bias as in [5]) to compute required pre-
conditions 𝐿ReqPre and required trigger-conditions 𝐿ReqTrig
such that 𝐿ℰ ∪ 𝐿PS |= 𝐿Π+(PS) where |= is an entailment
operator defined with respect to stable model semantics [21],
whilst ensuring that 𝐿ℰ ∪𝐿PS ̸|= 𝐿𝜋− for any 𝐿𝜋− ∈ 𝐿Π−(PS).
The programs 𝐿ReqPre ∪ 𝐿ReqTrig are then translated back to
LTL following the method described in [5].
7 EVALUATION
Our evaluation aims to assess whether the synthesised preser-
vation specification prescribes to preserve i) relevant events
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and ii) the minimal amount of events necessary to support
speculative hypotheses of potential incidents. To achieve this
aim, we apply our prototype tool to two case studies pub-
licly available for research and training purposes. Each case
study comprises data that would normally be available to
an investigator for examination (when a FR controller is
not implemented). The investigator can use this data to ex-
plain, if possible, how a particular incident occurred. For
each incident, we manually modelled the environment and
the speculative hypotheses in EC. From this, we used our tool
to generate preservation specifications automatically. The EC
models of the case studies and the generated specifications
are available online4.
We compare the events that the generated specification
prescribes to preserve with those that would be available to an
investigator when the system that does not satisfy evidence
preservation requirements, i.e. the information available to
an investigator is represented by the data-sets provided with
the case studies. To assess relevance, we verify whether our
specification prescribes to preserve events that were relevant
to satisfy the speculative hypotheses. We also check if oc-
currence of those events can be inferred from the available
data-set. To assess minimality we verify that our approach
prescribes preserving fewer events. In particular, we compare
the number of events that our approach prescribes to pre-
serve with those that can be inferred from the data-set. We
also measure the number of events, whose occurrence can be
inferred from the data-set, which were irrelevant to support
the satisfaction of the hypotheses.
7.1 Relevance and Minimality
The first incident scenario we considered is set in a university,
where students and academic staff can send emails by using
the university and students’ residence internal network. The
model of the environment includes different agents who can
be academics or students, and can teach or attend courses,
respectively. It also includes locations, such as university
and students residences, routers (each of them placed in a
location), emails and their corresponding sender/recipient
email and IP addresses. We also model whether an email
address is a university address for staff and students or it is
an external address.
The primitive events we model cover events whose occur-
rence can be inferred from the data-set5. This includes the
TCP packets captured from the routers located inside the
students’ residence. Therefore, we consider the routers as
digital sources within the environment and use primitive
events to represent network data streams. We model the
following primitive events: IMAP/POP network traffic (we
indicate primitive events related to emails sent from external
addresses to an academic as SUE); incoming HTTP traffic
(we indicate HTTP messages used to set-up a cookie as SC );
general outgoing HTTP traffic (EM ) and specific outgoing
4https://github.com/lpasquale/kEEPER/tree/keeper CLI
5http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/scenarios/
nitroba-university-harassment-scenario
HTTP traffic towards anonymous email services (SAE ). Some
of the complex events we model include: (i) emails received
by a specific email address (ii) cookie setting from an external
address to an IP; (iii) sending of HTTP messages from an
IP address and a browser agent; (iv) sending of anonymous
emails from an IP address and a browser agent. The com-
plex event indicating setting of a cookie initiates the state
cookieSet for a specified email and IP address.
An incident of concern is related to the receipt of harass-
ment emails by academics. The following speculative hypothe-
ses were constructed: h1 : an email is sent to an academic
by someone using an external address; h2 : an anonymous
email is sent by an individual who can be identified for ex-
ample through the cookie and his/her browser agents; h3 :
an anonymous email is sent by an individual who cannot be
identified. h1 is satisfied when complex event (i) takes place
for which the sender email address is external and the recipi-
ent email address is owned by a university staff member. For
supporting h1, the implemented specification recommended
preserving all incoming IMAP/POP network traffic (SUE)
related to emails sent from external addresses to an academic.
h2 is satisfied when a cookie is set for a specific email and
IP address, complex event (iii) takes place for which HTTP
traffic originates from the same IP address with which the
cookie is associated, and subsequently complex event (iv)
takes places for which the IP address and the browser agent
have been previously associated with outgoing HTTP traffic.
For h2, the specification required preserving (a) incoming
HTTP traffic adopted to set-up a cookie (SC ), (b) outgoing
HTTP traffic from the same address to which the cookie was
set (EM ) and (c) outgoing HTTP traffic to send anonymous
emails (SAE). h3 is satisfied when complex event (iv) takes
place. Therefore, for h3 the specification requires preserving
all SAE events.
Table 1 shows the total time necessary to generate a spec-
ification for each hypothesis, and the time required by each
phase of the approach: histories generation (HG), specifica-
tion verification (SV) and specification synthesis (SS). For
each hypothesis, the number of supporting histories (out of
the total number generated) and negative histories necessary
to compute a specification, including the maximum length of
the histories, are shown. A higher number of positive and neg-
ative histories could have been given as input to the synthesis
activity without affecting the generated specification. The
maximum time was taken for the most complex hypothesis
(ℎ2) which also required the provision of negative histories.
Table 1: Performance in the harassment case study.
Instances Execution time (s)
#Pos #Neg Length HG SV SS Total
h1 1 / 4 0 1 ∼0 0.01 0.23 0.24
h2 1 / 32 4 3 0.08 0.19 39.913 40.183
h3 1 / 8 0 1 0.01 0.03 0.301 0.341
We implemented the specification of a FR controller able
to extract data stream from the data-set. Extracted data
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streams can support h2 since an incoming set-cookie mes-
sage associated with jcoach@gmail.com and received by IP
192.168.015.004 was preserved. Outgoing HTTP messages
from the same IP address and associated with a Mozilla
browser have also been recorded; the same browser appears
to have been used to send the anonymous email. This sup-
ports our theory that our approach would preserve data
that might represent relevant evidence if such an incident
were to occur. This would support investigators in priori-
tising their efforts, while ensuring that other events related
to alternative scenarios would have been preserved if such
scenarios occurred. Moreover, our approach also prescribes
to preserve events that might not be proactively retained by
digital sources. For example, the data-set does not include
events about IMAP/POP network traffic (SUE) necessary
to support hypothesis h1. This might be due to the fact that
network traffic was collected for a limited amount of time
and was not retained.
To assess minimality we compare the total number of
events whose occurrence can be inferred from the data-set
with those that our specification would prescribe to preserve.
The full data-set includes 577, 760 data streams (application
level messages) exchanged in 15, 508 communications between
different IP addresses. The number of data streams corre-
sponds to the total number of events that an investigator
would normally have to examine. The number and type of
event that our specification prescribed to preserve for each
hypothesis is shown in Table 2; the total number of events is
only 0.71% of the data streams in the entire data-set. More-
over, not all the events preserved were necessary to support
the hypotheses. For our scenario, only 956 data streams cor-
responding to HTTP traffic originating from the Mozilla
browser were necessary to support h2. Therefore, although
our specification consistently reduces the amount of data to
be analysed by an investigator, it does not completely ensure
the minimality requirement since 2874 (69%) data streams
were not relevant to support ℎ2.
Table 2: Number of events preserved.
SUE SC EM SAE
# Events
h1 0 – – –
h2 – 2 3830
300
h3 – – –
Total: 4132 events
We also applied our approach to a more complex corporate
exfiltration scenario6. The model of the environment includes
the company’s employees, their email addresses, computers,
employees’ access rights to computers, storage devices that
could be mounted and programs that are installed on each
computer. The available data-set consists of an image of the
hard drive of a Windows machine. Thus, primitive events
we modelled represent changes in the file system of a Win-
dow machine that can be observed from a hard drive image.
These include users’ logins, mount and unmount of devices,
installation of programs, and sent or received emails. Owing
6http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/scenarios/m57-jean
to space, we will not provide details of the model and the
specification generated for all the hypotheses of this example
and refer the reader to the project webpage.
An incident of concern is related to the exfiltration of a
confidential document of a company from the computer of the
chief financial officer (cfo). Six hypotheses were constructed
for this incident. Examples of these hypotheses are: h2 : the
document is sent via email to an external email address and
h5 : the document is copied while an external storage device is
mounted. To support h2 the specification requires preserving
user logins to a computer in which the document is stored and,
while a user is logged, sending of emails to a non-corporate
address including the confidential document attached. As
h5 is equal to the hypothesis of our running example, it
lead to the same preservation specification. For this incident
scenario the hypotheses we modelled were more complex and
a higher number of supporting and refuting histories were
generated. This increased the time the approach took to
learn a specification. Table 3 shows the time to generate a
preservation specification for each hypothesis.
We manually acquired the events identified from the com-
puter hard drive using Autopsy [10]. These were not sufficient
to support any of the hypotheses because some of the events
that our approach prescribes to preserve are not retained in a
computer hard drive image. For example, we cannot support
hypothesis ℎ2 speculating that the document might be sent
as an email attachment by an employee to a non-corporate
email address. In particular, although an event in the data-set
indicates that an email with the attached confidential docu-
ment was sent from the cfo’s email address (jean@m57.biz)
to an external address (tuckgorge@gmail.com), we cannot
conclude which user was logged on the machine since the
data-set only provides information about the last user login.
A similar situation arise with hypothesis h5 speculating that
the document may be copied to an external device, because
mounting of a storage device and copy of a file are events
that are not retained. If our specification was implemented
it would have ensured preservation of events necessary to
support ℎ2 and ℎ5 when they occurred.
Table 3: Performance in the exfiltration case study.
Instances Execution time (s)
#Pos #Neg Length HI SV SG Total
h1 2 / 12 2 2 0.01 0.05 7.756 7.816
h2 1 / 4 1 2 0.01 0.05 1.852 1.912
h3 4 / 18 14 3 0.1 0.28 1733.82 1734.2
h4 4 / 16 9 3 0.5 0.18 894.197 894.877
h3 4 / 18 14 3 0.1 0.28 1733.82 1734.2
h4 4 / 16 9 3 0.5 0.18 894.197 894.877
h5 1 4 3 0.05 0.2 43.851 44.101
h6 1 4 3 0.5 0.21 170.356 171.066
To assess minimality, Fig. 4 shows, for each hypothesis, the
number of events our approach would have preserved from the
hard drive image. We compared these figures with those that
an investigator would have examined from the data-set (No-
FR). Our approach would have resulted in significantly fewer
events to be examined for hypotheses h1–h6. For example,
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to support h2 it would be necessary to identify the mail
clients among the installed applications (133), inspect all the
outboxes associated with the accounts registered with the
mail clients (23 emails for the cfo’s outbox and no emails
for the Administrator outbox) and identify the users’ last
login (3). We cannot claim the same for h5 the generated
specification requires preserving users’ last logins, mounted
devices and file access operations, which are not present in
the data-set.
Figure 4: Number of events to be examined.
7.2 Discussion
The paper aims to ensure relevant events are preserved that
may serve as evidence, thus reducing the amount of data
investigators would have to search through. This is what is
evaluated. The paper is not concerned with reactive investi-
gations nor aiding open-ended investigations. We make the
assumption that the speculative hypotheses of an incident
are given in advance. Therefore a forensic-ready system will
be prepared to investigate only the incidents known a-priori.
This the assumption on which forensic readiness guidelines for
organisations are based on. Training experts (e.g., system/se-
curity administrator) to identify these is part of the business
requirements for implementing forensic measures [45] and
is outside the scope of our work. Furthermore, as the envi-
ronment and the speculative hypotheses are expected to be
known a priori, there is a risk that this knowledge can be used
to thwart the forensic-ready system itself — an individual
might adjust her behaviour to avoid preservation of events
indicating her involvement in an offense. Thus, applications
of our approach would require maintenance of confidentiality
of the system specification.
The performance of our approach decreases when ‘richer’
positive and negative histories are used [5] (a saturation point
is reached for 18 histories). This is caused by the increase
in the EC model size when grounded. The time taken to
synthesise a specification increases linearly with the length
of the considered preservation histories. A saturation point
is reached with histories having length 11. Note that the
scalability results purely depend on the open-source proto-
type tool7 used to support the specification synthesis. This
could be significantly improved by deploying learning tech-
niques for context-dependent learning [32], and distributed
reasoning [34].
7https://github.com/stefano-bragaglia/XHAIL
To show that our formalisation could yield a practical solu-
tion, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation, putting
aside usability issues. The definition of the model of the en-
vironment and the hypotheses of the university harrassment
and the corporate exfiltration scenarios required 2 and 3.5
days of work, respectively, to one of the paper’s authors. We
are developing a graphical interface that would mask the
complexity of the formal specification and help practitioners
represent potential incidents and how they may occur in the
environment. Such graphical interface is based on the model-
driven engineering principle to hide the complexity of the
EC language used to represent the environment and hypothe-
ses within a model. A model-based representation has the
potential to ensure correctness of the models by-design and
encourage re-usability of the environment and hypotheses
among experts.
8 RELATED WORK
Existing research on forensic readiness has mainly focused
on identifying high-level strategies which organisations can
implement to be forensic-ready. For example, Elyas et al. [15]
use focus groups to elicit required forensic readiness objectives
(e.g., regulatory compliance, legal evidence management) and
capabilities (organisational factors and forensic strategy).
Reddy and Venter [42] present a forensic readiness manage-
ment system taking into account event analysis capabilities,
domain-specific information (e.g., policies procedures and
training requirements), and costs (e.g., staff, infrastructure
and training costs). However, none of these approaches has
addressed the problem of how to implement forensic readiness
in existing IT systems— inspite of the standardisation of
forensic readiness processes (ISO/IEC 27043:20158) which
prescribes the planning and implementation of pre-incident
collection and analysis of evidence activities.
Shield et al. [48] propose performing continuous proactive
evidence preservation. However, in large scale environments
like cloud systems, monitoring all potential evidence is not
a viable solution, as it might be cumbersome to analyse.
Pasquale et al. [37] propose a more targeted approach, where
evidence preservation activities aim to detect potential attack
scenarios that can violate existing security policies. However,
this approach is less selective as it prescribe to preserve any
type of event within a history leading to an incident, inde-
pendently of other events that have previously occurred or
preserved. Existing work on data extraction for investiga-
tive purposes, such as E-Discovery [25], although supporting
retrieval of data for an investigation, it does not provide a
solution to engineer a forensic-ready system prescribing what
data should be preserved depending on its relevance to future
investigations.
With the growth of digital forensics as a discipline, inter-
est in rigorous approaches has increased. For example, Car-
rier [11] provides guidelines about the types of hypotheses
that should be formulated and the analysis to be performed
8http://www.iso.org/iso/iso catalogue/catalogue tc/catalogue detail.
htm?csnumber=44407
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to verify those hypotheses during a digital investigation. Oth-
ers [1, 8, 27, 47] have focused on providing a unified rep-
resentation of heterogeneous log events to automate event
reconstruction. Similar to us, all these approaches distinguish
between primitive events having a direct mapping to raw log
events and complex level events, which can be determined
by the occurrence of primitive ones. Formal techniques have
also been used to represent and analyse the behaviour of the
environment in order to identify the root causes that allowed
an incident to occur [50] or possible incident scenarios [23].
Other work is specialised on identifying attackers’ traces (e.g.,
evidence and timestamps improperly manipulated by an at-
tacker), from violations of invariant relationships between
digital objects [49] or by applying model checking techniques
on a set of events expressed in a multi-sorted algebra [7].
However, none of this work addresses the problem of how
hypotheses can be expressed formally, how they relate to
sequences of primitive and complex events supporting them
and how to achieve preservation requirements.
The requirements engineering community [26, 33, 53, 55]
proposed numerous techniques for modelling security and
privacy requirements to enable the design of systems less
vulnerable to potential attacks and privacy breaches. How-
ever, only preliminary attempts have been made towards
engineering forensic-ready systems [6, 38] and investigating
how forensic-readiness requirements are considered during
systems development lifecycles [24]. Although preservation re-
quirements can be considered as a specific type of monitoring
requirements [17, 18, 44, 46], the nature of the specifications
for forensic-ready systems is different in its scope (environ-
ment and hypotheses) and characteristics. These are aspects
that have not been covered in previous work.
Recent studies in program analysis, such as [19, 57], have
highlighted the importance of providing software developers
with automated support in making logging decisions and
difficulty in constructing specifications to guide logging be-
haviour. In [57] for instance, the authors present a method
for learning what and when to log from past logs of software
developers. This differs conceptually from what we present
here since incident-related histories are domain specific, show-
ing how particular hypotheses may be met within particular
environments. For forensic-ready systems, justification of
preservations need to be made explicit and in readable form,
which is supported by the learning technique that we deploy.
We believe however that our approach could help software de-
velopers in making informed decisions and insights on what
logs to preserve to enhance forensic-readiness of systems.
Closest to our work with in a forensic setting is that of [3, 30].
However [3] focuses on defining “ideal” logging preferences
for databases that is independent of the incidents of concern
and hence still poses a risk of inadequate logging. The work
of [30] instead is limited to eliciting from natural language
descriptions of software artefacts the set events (as verb-
object pairs) and an empirical classification of such events to
determine logging requirements.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper represents a first step towards a rigorous approach
to developing forensic-ready systems. We defined a frame-
work for formalising evidence preservation requirements of
such systems. We use this to synthesise specifications that
guarantee a minimal amount of data, constituting potentially
relevant evidence to support given speculative hypotheses of
incidents of concern, is preserved. We also provided a proof-
of-concept implementation that has been evaluated on two
incident scenarios. Our results demonstrate that our approach
preserves relevant events and provides insight into whether
existing software/devices have the necessary capabilities for
preserving evidence. Moreover, the size of preserved data
is smaller than what would have been examined during an
investigation otherwise. Our approach does not propose re-
placing the role of engineers nor investigators. It also assumes
that domain experts are involved in modelling the environ-
ment and selecting the relevant histories to be covered by
the preservation specifications.
In the future, we plan to investigate how our approach
may be adapted to dynamic situations at run-time in which
environments and hypotheses may change over time. We are
developing a graphical designer aimed to facilitate the practi-
tioners’ task of designing the model of the environment and
generation of hypotheses. Finally when generating a preser-
vation specification, we will consider systematic approaches
for synthesis when conflicts with other requirements, such as
legal requirements, are present which may forbid preserving
relevant data for privacy reasons.
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